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Dan L. Burkt and Mark A. Lemleytt
Patents have proven to be important to the growth and financ-
ing of the American biotechnology industry, but it remains unclear
whether current patent standards are well suited to the needs of
this industry. Patent law has a general set of legal rules to govern
the validity and infringement of patents in a wide variety of tech-
nologies. With a very few exceptions, the statute does not distin-
guish between different technologies in setting and applying legal
standards. Rather, those standards are designed to adapt flexibly
to new technologies, encompassing "anything under the sun that is
made by man. '' 2 In theory, then, ours is a unified patent system
that provides technology-neutral protection to all kinds of tech-
nologies.
However, we have recently noticed an increasing divergence
between the rules actually applied to different industries. Biotech-
nology provides one of the best examples. In biotechnology cases,
the Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that uncertainty in predict-
ing the structural features of biotechnological inventions renders
them nonobvious, even if the prior art demonstrates a clear plan
for producing the invention. At the same time, the court claims
that the uncertain nature of the technology requires imposition of
stringent patent enablement and written description requirements
that are not applied to patents in other disciplines. Thus, as a prac-
tical matter, it appears that, although patent law is technology-
neutral in theory, it is technology-specific in application. We pro-
0 2004 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley. An earlier version of this Article appeared as
chapter 16 in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: ADVANCES IN
GENETICS 50 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003).
t Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
" Elizabeth Josslyn Boalt Chair in Law, Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley;
of counsel, Keker & Van Nest LLP.
2 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5
(1952); H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
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vide evidence for this claim in Part I. While this Article focuses
on biotechnology, which presents an extreme example, our find-
ings have implications for other industries as well, notably small-
molecule chemistry.
Part II begins by exploring how the application of the same
legal standards can lead to such different results in diverse indus-
tries. Much of the variance in patent standards is attributable to
the use of a legal construct, the "person having ordinary skill in the
art" ("PHOSITA"), to determine obviousness and enablement.
The more skill those in the art have, the less information a patentee
must disclose, but the harder it ,is to prove an invention nonobvi-
ous. The level of skill in the art affects not just patent validity, but
also patent scope. Because both claim construction and the doc-
trine of equivalents turn on the understanding of the PHOSITA in
certain circumstances, judgments the court makes about those in-
dustries affect the scope of those patents that do issue.
One reading of the biotechnology cases is that the Federal
Circuit believes that biotechnology experts know very little about
their art-at least, this seems the clear implication of the court's
holdings and accompanying analyses. We do not challenge the
idea that the standards in each industry should vary, nor the idea
that that variation depends in part on the level of skill in that in-
dustry. As we have explained elsewhere, patent law should be
technology-specific, because the industries it affects are not ho-
mogenous.3 We think the use of the PHOSITA provides needed
flexibility for patent law, permitting it to adapt to new technolo-
gies without losing its essential character. We fear, however, that
the Federal Circuit has not applied that standard properly in bio-
technology. The court has a static perception of the field that was
set in its initial analyses of biotechnology inventions, but which
does not reflect the realities of the industry.
In Part III, we offer a very preliminary policy assessment of
these industry-specific patent cases. We suggest that the special
rules the Federal Circuit has constructed for biotech cases are
rather poorly matched to the specific needs of the industry. In-
deed, in some ways the Federal Circuit cases have it exactly back-
wards. We offer a few suggestions as to what a consciously de-
signed biotechnology patent policy may look like. In doing so, we
hope to lay the groundwork for broader exposition of those ideas,
and suggestions for implementing them.
3 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575
(2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers].
[Vol. 54:3
BIOTECHNOLOGY'S UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE
I. HETEROGENEITY IN THE PATENT LAW
Intellectual property law generally aims to solve the "public
goods" problem that arises in regard to creative activity. Legal
rights in inventions allow inventors to control and profit from
goods that are costly to produce, but which are virtually costless to
reproduce or to appropriate once they have been created. A vari-
ety of intellectual property systems have been promulgated to deal
with this problem for different, if occasionally overlapping, areas
of subject matter. These various degrees and modes of legal pro-
tection carry different scopes and lengths of protection, hopefully
roughly appropriate to their subject areas. Copyright is generally
addressed to artistic or aesthetic works, although it now includes
software in its ambit; patent law generally addresses industrial or
technological inventions; trade secrecy covers a wide range of
valuable business assets. Each of these modes of protection covers
a wide swath of subject matter; specialized statutes, sometimes
called "sui generis" laws, are relatively rare.4 As a practical mat-
ter, Congress cannot enact a new form of intellectual property stat-
5ute each time a new technology arises. Nevertheless, there are
drawbacks to encompassing many types of subject matter within
one broad system.
A. The History of the Uniform Patent System
A patent statute was one of the first laws Congress passed, in
1790. Since that time, a patent statute has been a constant feature
4 At various times commentators have called for sui generis protection of specific subject
matter. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA Sequences, 29 JURIMET-
RICS J. 469, 530-31 (1989) (biotechnology); Kenneth D. Crews, Looking Ahead and Shaping the
Future: Provoking Change in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'y USA 549, 564 (2001)
('"One-size-fits-all' ultimately fits few."); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Com-
puter Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1364-65 (1987) (computer software); Pamela
Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying the Lessons of the Chip
Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 507, 529-31 (1985) (computer software);
cf. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive
System?, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 53 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001)
("[I]ntellectual property regimes should be designed so that the subject matter of each one has
relatively homogenous needs for protection."). The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984
is one of the few examples where Congress heeded such encouragement. It created a unique
form of intellectual property in the "mask works" embodying semiconductor chip circuit de-
signs. See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2000).
1 See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1819 (1984) ("[O]ur patent policymaker, Congress, is noted for inaction and has not
changed the patent life in over a century. This suggests that Congress is not making.. . ongoing
adjustments."); see also Richard M. Stem, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47
U. PIr. L. REV. 1229, 1261 (1986) ("It is unrealistic to expect Congress to focus on ... issues
over and over again, in successive new technological contexts. There is a serious problem re-
garding attention span, general impatience, and the fact that Congress has other concerns, such
as foreign affairs, tax reform, and insuring domestic tranquility.").
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of the U.S. legal landscape.6 While the nature of the patent system
went through some rather dramatic changes in the first fifty years
of the Republic-beginning with a requirement that two cabinet
officials must personally review and sign off on any patent, 7 and
swinging to the other extreme with an automatic registration sys-
tem subject to caveats 8-by 1836 the essential features of modern
patent law were in place. 9 Despite periodic revisions, most re-
cently in 1952, the basic structure of the patent system has re-
mained unchanged for 165 years.
Technology, of course, has changed dramatically during that
time. The "useful arts" envisioned by the Framers were mechani-
cal inventions useful in a primarily agrarian economy. Since that
time, the country has gone through several periods of dramatic in-
novation in a wide variety of fields. As late as 1950, though, most
inventions were still mechanical in nature. It is only in the last
half-century-and to a large extent in the last twenty-five years, as
Allison and Lemley show'°-that patent law has lost its primarily
mechanical character, branching out into biotechnology, semicon-
ductors, computer hardware and software, electronics, and tele-
communications.
What is notable about this history is that the fundamental
rules of patent law were set in a world in which inventions were
mechanical. Because inventions in the past were far more ho-
mogenous than they are today,"' it made sense to have a unified set
of rules for dealing with those inventions. The application of those
old rules to new technologies has not been free from controversy.
Some have suggested that the unified rules suitable for the old,
homogeneous world are no longer appropriate in today's increas-
6 See, e.g., BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT
LAW 126, 143 (1967); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts:
American Patent Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (pts. 1 & 2), 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 61 (1997); 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 11 (1998). Even before that time,
the U.S. colonies granted patent rights. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 109 (3d ed. 2003).
7 This was a feature of the short-lived Patent Act of 1790. See Edward C. Walterscheid,
Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 519-20
(1997) (detailing the features of the Patent Act).
8 The 1793 Act replaced the cumbersome cabinet-level review with a registration system.
Under this system, patents were granted without examination unless a competitor or other inter-
ested party filed a "caveat"-essentially a request to be notified and given a chance to object if
someone patented in a particular field. Walterscheid, supra note 7, at 72-73.
9 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 6, at 109-10.
10 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States
Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REv. 77, 87-94 (2002) (comparing the results of a study of patents




ingly complex innovative landscape.1 2  But without changing the
rules themselves, in the last dozen years the Federal Circuit has
applied those rules in a way that effectively creates different stan-
dards for different industries.13 In the sections that follow, we ex-
amine the legal treatment of one such industry-biotechnology-
in detail.
B. Biotechnology Patent Cases
14
In stark contrast to the Federal Circuit decisions in other tech-
nologies, 15 recent decisions involving genetic material have im-
posed a stringent disclosure standard for patenting macromole-
cules.' 6 The court has placed particular emphasis on the "written
12 See, e.g., S. Benjamin Pleune, Trouble with the Guidelines: On Urging the PTO to
Properly Evolve with Novel Technologies, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 365 (arguing for
DNA-specific legislation). For a critical analysis of such proposals, see Dan L. Burk, Biotech-
nology and Patent Law: Fitting Innovation to the Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 1 (1991).
13 Hodges observes that computers and biotechnology are treated differently in the written
description cases, though he limits his focus primarily to biotechnology. Robert A. Hodges,
Note, Black Box Biotech Inventions: When a "Mere Wish or Plan" Should Be Considered an
Adequate Description of the Invention, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 831, 833 (2001). Others have
complained that even within industries the standard may not be applied consistently. See, e.g.,
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 365 & n.13
(2001).
14 For background on the science of biotechnology, see generally ROBERT P. MERGES ET
AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2003 CASE AND STATUTORY
SUPPLEMENT 479-94; Dan L. Burk, A Biotechnology Primer, 55 U. PrTr. L. REV. 611 (1994).
15 For example, the Federal Circuit has articulated very loose, almost trivial standards for
disclosure of computer software. See, e.g., N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that only minimal disclosure is needed for enablement, because im-
plementation is "a mere clerical function to a skilled programmer"). For elaboration of how
software cases differ from biotechnology cases, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley,
Technology-Specific].
16 We acknowledge the contrary view of a few commentators that the Federal Circuit's
biotechnology cases are simply decided on their individual facts and do not reflect any patterns.
See, e.g., John W. Schlicher, Biotechnology and the Patent System: Patent Law and Procedures
for Biotechnology, Health Care and Other Industries, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 121, 127
(1996) ("I do not understand the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to have created a
subset of patent law doctrines for biotechnology."); Lawrence M. Sung, On Treating Past as
Prologue, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 75, 107; R. Polk Wagner, Of Patents and Path De-
pendency: A Comment on Burk and Lemley, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1341 (2003) [hereinafter
Wagner, Path Dependency]. But other commentators appear to recognize that something un-
usual is happening in the case of biotechnology. See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 13, at 831-33
(hypothesizing two inventions, one in the area of computer technology and one in the area of
biotechnology, and the disparate treatment the inventions would receive under current patent
law); Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 649 (1998) ("The Federal Circuit
has fashioned a newly heightened written description standard unique to biotechnological inven-
tions without meaningful explanation of policy concerns that would justify such a significant
departure from earlier written description principles."); Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the
Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 209 (1998) (noting that
the Federal Circuit has departed from previous written description jurisprudence in recent bio-
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description" requirement of section 112, which requires the pat-
entee to specifically describe the claimed invention as part of the
disclosure. The justification for such a detailed description is to
demonstrate to others of ordinary skill that the inventor in fact has
the invention in her possession; the assumption being that a suffi-
ciently detailed description would not be possible if the inventor
were speculating or guessing about its features. 17 This requirement
is separate from (and potentially more stringent than) the enable-
ment requirement. Although the two are closely connected, satis-
fying one requirement does not necessarily satisfy the other. The
classic example offered by one court is the situation in which the
description of a particular chemical compound enables one of or-
dinary skill to make other, related, compounds, yet those other
compounds are not described in the patent disclosure. The first
compound is both enabled and described; the others are only en-
abled.' 8
This venerable chemical patenting hypothetical has been
brought to life by the Federal Circuit's biotechnology opinions.
For example, in Fiers v. Revel, 19 the court considered the decision
of the Patent Office in a three-way interference over patent appli-
cations claiming the human DNA sequence that produces the pro-
tein fibroblast beta-interferon ("P5-IF"). ° One of the applicants,
Revel, relied for priority upon his Israeli patent application, which
disclosed methods for isolating a fragment of the DNA sequence
coding for -IF and for isolating messenger RNA coding for 3-IF.
The court considered whether the disclosure in Revel's Israeli ap-
plication satisfied the written description requirement and could
therefore support a U.S. application. The Federal Circuit upheld a
determination by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
that Revel's disclosure was not an adequate description, largely
technology decisions); Margaret Sampson, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written De-
scription Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1233 (2000) (focusing on the Federal Circuit's current trend toward heightening both
the entitlement and written description requirements for biotechnology inventions). It seems
readily apparent to us, as to the majority of other commentators, that the biotechnology cases
consistently depart from the standards applied in other industries.
17 Of course, in the case of constructive reduction to practice, or filing a "paper patent"
without having actually made the invention, the inventor is in some sense speculating or guess-
ing about the features of an invention not yet built. But even in that instance, the underlying
assumption in patent law is that the inventor "has" the invention mentally, and so can give a
sufficiently detailed description of that inventive conception-physically creating the invention
is straightforward.
18 In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.l (C.C.P.A. 1971).
19 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993).




because it failed to disclose the actual sequence of the DNA mole-
cule at issue. According to the court's reasoning, disclosing a
method for obtaining the molecule was not the same as disclosing
the molecule itself:
An adequate written description of a DNA requires more than
a mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference
to a potential method for isolating it; what is required is a de-
scription of the DNA itself .... A bare reference to a DNA
with a statement that it can be obtained by reverse transcrip-
tion is not a description; it does not indicate that Revel was in
possession of the DNA.z1
Since the Revel application did not disclose the sequence for the
molecule claimed, the court characterized it as disclosing merely
"a wish, or arguably a plan, for obtaining the DNA. 22 Under Fi-
ers, an inventor does not conceive of a DNA invention until she
actually creates it.
23
A similar conclusion was reached in a subsequent case, Re-
gents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. 24 The pat-
ent at issue covered a microorganism carrying the DNA sequence
coding for human insulin. The patentee supported this claim by
disclosing a method for obtaining the human cDNA,25 as well as
the amino acid sequences for the insulin protein and the corre-
sponding insulin DNA sequence in rats. Relying on the Fiers
opinion, the court concluded that the written description require-
ment again was not met: "Describing a method of preparing a
cDNA or even describing the protein that the cDNA encodes, as
the example does, does not necessarily describe the DNA itself.,
26
In reaching these results, the Federal Circuit has been ada-
mant that the degree of specificity required for an adequate de-
21 Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1170-71.
22 Id. at 1171.
23 See also Adang v. Fischhoff, 286 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (disclosure of genetically
altered tobacco plant did not enable claim to genetically altered tomato plant); Hitzeman v.
Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (conception of biotechnology invention simultaneous
with reduction to practice). To be sure, the court stopped short of creating an absolute rule,
noting that "[tlhere may be situations where an organism's performance of certain intracellular
processes might be reasonably predictable, and evidence of such predictability might be suffi-
cient to support a finding of conception prior to reduction to practice." Hitzeman, 243 F.3d at
1357. But even here the court's language focuses on organic processes, not DNA sequences.
24 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
25 cDNA, or complementary DNA, is produced by reverse transcribing the messenger
RNA transcript of genomic DNA. DAVID FREIFELDER & GEORGE M. MALACINSKI, ESSEN-
TIALS OF MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 398 (3d ed. 1998). This process reverses the usual flow of
genetic information from DNA to RNA, but the cDNA transcript is not necessarily identical to
the genomic DNA template, as the mRNA sequence may have been edited after translation. Id.
26 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
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scription of nucleic acids requires description of "structure, for-
,,27
mula, chemical name, or physical properties. In Eli Lilly, be-
cause "[n]o sequence information indicating which nucleotides
constitute human cDNA appears in the patent ... the specification
does not provide a written description of the invention., 28 The
court seems particularly incensed by applicants who designate a
macromolecule by generic or functional terms, such as "vertebrate
insulin cDNA":
A definition by function.., is only an indication of what the
gene does, rather than what it is. It is only a definition of a
useful result rather than a definition of what achieves that re-
sult. Many such genes may achieve that result. The descrip-
tion requirement of the patent statute requires a description of
an invention, not an indication of a result that one might
achieve if one made that invention. Accordingly, naming a
type of material generally known to exist, in the absence of
knowledge as to what that material consists of, is not a de-
scription of that material.29
The failure to describe more than one or two nucleotides is a par-
ticular problem where the patent claims are drawn to a broad class
of nucleotides. For example, Revel's claim covered all DNA
molecules that code for P-IF, but "[c]laiming all DNAs that
achieve a result without defining what means will do so is not in
compliance with the description requirement; it is an attempt to
preempt the future before it has arrived., 30
The Federal Circuit's construction of the written description
requirement as requiring precise sequence data gains particular
significance whenever claims are drawn to an entire genus, or fam-
ily, of molecules. The patent discussed in the Eli Lilly written de-
scription analysis claimed a broad family of DNA molecules cod-
ing for insulin in different mammalian species, and it was clear
that the patent enabled the identification of those mammalian DNA
sequences, but the patent actually disclosed only one species of
DNA, that coding for rat insulin. The court held this to be insuffi-
cient to describe the broad class of cDNAs coding for mammalian
or vertebrate insulin.3' Although declining to specify exactly what
would be needed to support a broad claim, the court cited previous
chemical cases dealing with related groups of small molecules.
27 Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1171.
28 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
29 Id. at 1568 (citations omitted).
30 Fiers, 984 F.2dat 1171.
31 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
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Based on these cases, the court declared that macromolecules
should be treated in the same fashion: The patentee need not show
every member of a claimed genus, but is required to show a "rep-
resentative" number of cDNAs illustrating or defining the common
structural features of a "substantial" portion of the genus.32
A similarly broad claim was rejected in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharmaceutical Co. as failing the standard for enablement rather
than written description.33  There, the patentee claimed nucleic
acid sequences coding for the protein erythropoetin or for other
proteins with the same biological function. The trial judge con-
cluded that because Amgen was unable to specify which analogs
might have the biological properties claimed, the claims were not
enabled. 34 The Federal Circuit panel, however, held that the dis-
trict court had reached the right conclusion for the wrong reason.
While the district court focused on the thousands of EPO analogs
that could be created by substituting amino acid residues in the
polypeptide chain, the appellate court focused on the patentee's
failure to disclose the DNA molecules that would code for those
analogs.35 Since the claims were directed to DNA sequences, the
issue was not the enablement of the EPO analogs, but rather the
enablement of the myriad DNA sequences, which the court held
could not be made and used on the basis of a few examples.36
In an important recent decision, the Federal Circuit backed off
somewhat from its categorical insistence on structure in biotech-
nology disclosure cases. In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe
Inc., 37 the court adopted the PTO's Guidelines on Written Descrip-
tion. 38 The Guidelines provide that biotechnology inventions nor-
mally must be described by structure, but may also be described by
"functional characteristics when coupled with a known or dis-
closed correlation between function and structure, 39 The court
specifically identified antibody claims as ones that might be de-
scribed by function-i.e., by describing the antigen to which they
bind.4° Its holding was more limited, however. It held that the
32 Id. at 1569.
33 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
34 Id. at 1205.
35 Id. at 1212-14.
36 Id.
37 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
38 Id. at 1324-25.
39 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Guidelines for the Examination of Patent Applications
Under the 35 U.S.C. 112 "Written Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5,
2001).
40 Enzo v. Gen-Probe, 296 F.3d at 1324; see also Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (adopting Ely Lilly, but holding that it did not apply
to a patent that identified cells producing a human protein that was itself already well-known).
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deposit of three actual DNA sequences created a factual question
as to whether the deposited sequences could satisfy the written de-
scription requirement for claims covering those sequences and a
broader genus. Because the deposited sequences inherently in-
cluded the structure of the gene, the court in Enzo v. Gen-Probe
had no opportunity to endorse claims based entirely on proof of
function rather than structure. The court did not repudiate, and
indeed relied upon, the Eli Lilly baseline rule that disclosure of
structure was required.
Any thought that Enzo v. Gen-Probe had limited the restric-
tive rules of Fiers and Eli Lilly to DNA sequences was dispelled
by the decision in Noelle v. Lederman.4' In that case, the patentee
claimed a genus of mammalian antibodies. The court acknowl-
edged that antibodies could be claimed on the basis of their func-
tional characteristics-that is, their binding affinities-"as long as
an applicant has disclosed a 'fully characterized antigen."' 42 But
the court refused to permit the patentee to claim a genus of mam-
malian antibodies to a particular type of antigen because it had de-
scribed only the mouse antigen. In order to justify claims to a ge-
nus of mammalian antibodies, the patentee was required to de-
scribe the antigens specific to each species, as well as the binding
affinity of each of the antibodies in the genus. The effect of
Noelle is precisely analogous to Eli Lilly-in order to claim a ge-
nus in biotechnology on the basis of functional characteristics, the
patentee must meet the impossible burden of describing all or at
least most of the species in the genus.
The same concerns that characterize the Federal Circuit's ju-
risprudence of biotechnology disclosure-the inadequacy of meth-
odological disclosure, the requirement to specify sequence or
structure, and uncertainty of selection within large classes of ho-
mologous molecules-have shaped the Federal Circuit's biotech-
nology obviousness cases. However, in the case of obviousness,
the issue has been the presence of such factors in the prior art,
rather than in the inventor's disclosure. Thus, the Federal Circuit
held in In re Bell that a claim to DNA coding for human insulin-
like growth factor ("hIGF") was not obvious even though the prior
art disclosed the amino acid sequence for the hIGF proteins and a
method for using that information to obtain the corresponding
DNA molecule.43 Under similar facts in In re Deuel, the court
found claims directed to DNA coding for heparin binding growth
4' 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
42 Id. at 1349.
43 991 F.2d 781, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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factors ("HBGFs") were not obvious in light of prior art disclosure
of a partial amino acid sequence and a method for using that in-
formation to obtain the corresponding DNA molecule. 44
Each decision rested largely upon the court's perception that
the actual sequence of the claimed DNA molecules was uncertain
or unpredictable from the prior art. In both cases the court dis-
missed as irrelevant the biological relationship between the mole-
cules disclosed in the prior art and those claimed by the patent.
The amino acid sequences of the proteins disclosed in the prior art
are ultimately determined by the sequence of RNA nucleotides
coding for the protein, which is in turn determinative of the cDNA
claimed in the patent. 45  The correspondence of nucleotide se-
quences to amino acid sequences is well-known as key to the "cen-
tral dogma" of molecular biology: the transfer of genetic informa-
tion from DNA to RNA to protein chains. However, particular
amino acids can correspond to more than one nucleotide sequence,
introducing uncertainty into the inverse relationship: that of amino
acid sequence to nucleotide sequence. Because of this redundancy
or "degeneracy" in the genetic code, the court noted in Bell that a
vast number of possible sequences-about 1036 --might code for
the protein sequences disclosed in the prior art. The plaintiff
claimed only one of these, in essence having searched among a
large number of possibilities to select the particular cDNA se-
quence coding for hIGF.
Numerous commentators have pointed out that such a search
is relatively routine using tried and true techniques of molecular
biology. 46 But prior art disclosure of a method, even an admittedly
obvious method, was held insufficient to cure such uncertainty of
structure. In rejecting the DNA claims in Bell and Deuel, the court
rejected the PTO's focus on known methods for potentially isolat-
ing the claimed DNA molecules as "misplaced" because the claims
44 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
45 Neither In re Bell nor In re Deuel dealt with genomic DNA ("gDNA") sequences,
which are transcribed by cellular proteins to produce a messenger RNA molecule. See
FREIFELDER & MALACINSKI, supra note 25 (describing the transcription process). Both cases
considered non-naturally occurring cDNA sequences, which are reverse transcribed from mes-
senger RNAs. The correspondence between gDNA and RNA may be very different than that of
cDNA to RNA, especially in eukaryotic organisms where the processing of RNA transcripts
may be extensive. Id.
4 See, e.g., PHILIPPE G. DUCOR, PATENTING THE RECOMBINANT PRODUCTS OF BIOTECH-
NOLOGY 80 (1998); Arti K. Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to
PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 199 (2000) [hereinafter Rai, Patent Gold Rush];
Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827 (1999) [hereinafter Rai, Addressing New Technology]; Anita Varma
& David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance Between Biotech
Inventors and the Market, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 53 (1996).
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at issue define compounds, not methods. 47 Prior to Bell, the opin-
ion in Amgen v. Chugai had stressed the uncertainty of the meth-
ods for gene location available at the time of invention:
[While] it might have been feasible, perhaps obvious to try,
to successfully probe a human gDNA library with a monkey
cDNA probe, it does not indicate that the gene could have
been identified and isolated with a reasonable likelihood of
success....
... [T]here was no reasonable expectation of success in
obtaining the EPO gene by the method that Lin eventually
used.48
The court arguably just got the science wrong; by the time of the
research at issue in Bell, such methods for searching a large uni-
verse of molecules were perhaps painstaking and time-consuming,
but had an established likelihood of success.
Yet the court defined the issue in Bell and Deuel not as a mat-
ter of the uncertainty of obtaining a particular sequence, but of the
uncertainty of predicting or visualizing from the prior art what se-
quence would be found. Even in the Amgen v. Chugai opinion, the
court hinted that the key to macromolecular obviousness lay in the
prediction of an exact sequence, as "[n]either the DNA nucleotide
sequence ... nor its exact degree of homology with the [prior art]
monkey EPO gene was known at the time. 49 And in Deuel, the
court explicitly held that "until the claimed molecules were actu-
ally isolated and purified, it would have been highly unlikely for
one of ordinary skill in the art to contemplate what was ultimately
obtained. What cannot be contemplated or conceived cannot be
obvious."' 50 Thus a likelihood-or even a certainty-of finding a
DNA molecule with particular properties was deemed essentially
irrelevant to whether structural claims to that molecule are obvi-
ous.
51
The corollary to this holding is that a molecule will be obvi-
ous if the sequence is discernible in the prior art, even if its func-
47 Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1558; Bell, 991 F.2d at 785 ("[T]he PTO's focus on Bell's method is
misplaced. Bell does not claim a method. Bell claims compositions, and the issue is the obvi-
ousness of the claimed compositions, not of the method by which they are made.").
48 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co. 927 F.2d 1200, 1208-09.
49 Id.
50 51 F.3d at 1558 (emphasis added).
5' Cf Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 1335, 1357-58 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (holding that addition of a second transit peptide to a string of amino acids with a
transit peptide and a fragment of a second transit peptide was not obvious because the amino
acids were structurally different).
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tion is not. Prior art description of the "general idea of the claimed
molecules, their function, and their general chemical nature, 52 is
insufficient to render a molecule obvious. Some commentators
have suggested that this formulation of obviousness stands some
danger of collapsing into the standard for anticipation; 53 under sec-
tion 102 of the Patent Act, an invention lacks patentable novelty if
its elements are fully described in a prior art reference, and the
Federal Circuit's obviousness requirement could be read to require
such a prior art anticipation as the effective standard for obvious-
ness. 54  But unlike the requirements for anticipation, the Federal
Circuit's biotechnology obviousness standard appears to require
that the sequence of the DNA be predictable from the prior art, and
not necessarily explicitly described. For example, the court in
Deuel suggests that for "a protein of sufficiently small size and
simplicity . . . lacking redundancy, each possible DNA would be
obvious over the protein., 55 Although the Federal Circuit has not
explicitly held so, one would also suspect that disclosure in the
prior art of a substantial number of homologous sequences would
render a new homologue predictable, and so render it obvious-
just as the court has held that disclosure of a substantial number of
homologues is enough to satisfy the written description require-
ment for a genus of homologues. Similarly, the Federal Circuit
has given broader meaning to certain types of biotechnology dis-
closures outside the DNA and antibody contexts, where it was per-
suaded that the characteristics of that particular disclosure were
well-known or predictable in the art.56
The Federal Circuit's biotechnology obviousness cases are all
of a piece with the court's earlier holdings, such as the rejection on
disclosure grounds of Revel's claim to all DNA sequences coding
for P-IF.57 Due to degeneracy in the genetic code, Revel could not
52 Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1558.
53 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the Pat-
entability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences,
23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 32 (1995).
54 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has several times suggested that the two patent standards are
closely linked, characterizing obviousness as a sort of continuum with anticipation as the "epit-
ome" or "ultimate" endpoint of obviousness. See, e.g., In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d
388 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Connell v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
55 51 F.3d at 1559.
56 See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that
the description of functional characteristics can satisfy the written description requirement only
if those characteristics are "coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and
structure").
57 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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adequately describe the claimed invention as DNA coding for [3-
IF; an astronomically large number of possible sequences might do
so. And if a functional or narrative description in a patent is insuf-
ficient to properly describe a DNA molecule coding for 13-IF, the
presence of a functional or narrative description of P-IF protein in
the prior art would be insufficient to render the molecule obvious.
According to the court, one cannot describe what one has not con-
ceived, and what cannot be contemplated or conceived cannot be
obvious. Just as disclosure in a patent of a method for obtaining a
particular cDNA is inadequate to properly describe the invention,
so disclosure in the prior art of a method for obtaining a particular
cDNA cannot render the claimed invention obvious.
The conceptual linkage of obviousness and enablement to the
depiction of macromolecular sequences in, respectively, the prior
art or the patent disclosure, dictates a particular and predictable
result for the availability and scope of such biotechnology patents.
The expected outcome is that DNA patents will be numerous but
extremely narrow. Under the Federal Circuit's precedent, a re-
searcher will be able to claim only sequences disclosed under the
stringent written description rules-the actual sequence in hand, so
to speak. And as Judge Learned Hand observed long ago, a claim
that covers only the thing invented is a weak claim indeed.58 At
the same time, the inventor is shielded from obviousness by the
lack of such explicit and detailed disclosure in the prior art. This
lack of effective prior art seems to dictate that anyone who has iso-
lated and characterized a novel DNA molecule is certain to receive
a patent on it. But the inventor will receive a patent only on that
molecule, as the Federal Circuit appears to regard other related
molecules as inadequately described until their sequence is dis-
closed.
The set of axioms underlying this set of results forms a logical
framework that may be extended to certain other biotechnology
inventions. For example, one would conclude from the Federal
Circuit's analysis in these cases that a cDNA should be obvious in
light of its corresponding mRNA,59 since the former is reverse
transcribed from the latter, and there is no redundancy or degener-
acy in the correspondence between the nucleotides in the two
molecules. 60 However, an mRNA or corresponding cDNA need
58 See Philip A. Hunt Co. v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 177 F.2d 583, 585-86 (2d Cir.
1949) (noting that it may be impossible to write claims of appropriate scope without using func-
tional language to describe variants).
59 mRNA, or messenger RNA, is the complementary molecule produced from transcrip-
tion of genomic DNA. See FREIFELDER & MALACINSKI, supra note 25, at 159.
60 LUBERT STRYER, BIOCHEMISTRY 132 (3d ed. 1988); JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., MO-
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not render obvious the genomic DNA ("gDNA") from which it is
derived, since in many organisms the gDNA will include interven-
ing sequences, or introns, that are not predictable from the mRNA
sequence.
In University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 61 the court
extended this principle from large or macromolecule (i.e., DNA)
chemistry to small-molecule chemistry, making clear that the prin-
ciples developed in the DNA context have broader applicability.
Relying on its holdings in the DNA cases, the court concluded that
the patentee had not adequately described a method of using COX-
1 and COX-2 inhibitors because it had not identified the com-
pounds that bind to the Cox enzymes. The court went further,
however, indicating that even knowing the structure of the Cox
enzymes would not necessarily permit one "to predict what com-
pounds might bind to and inhibit them. '62  The court ultimately
based its result on a rejection of functional claiming in the chemi-
cal arts: "the description must convey what the compound is, not
just what it does. 63
Perhaps more important than the extension of the Federal Cir-
cuit's logic to other classes of molecules is the extension of its
logic to other patent doctrines. For example, as we have indicated
with regard to software, patent scope is a function of the obvious-
ness and written description requirements. Under the court's deci-
sions, the literal scope of biotechnology patents will be quite nar-
row: Patent claims are confined to the DNA sequences actually
generated and disclosed, rather than those enabled by the patentee.
While that scope may be broadened by the doctrine of equiva-
lents, 64 the recent trend to limit the scope of the doctrine of equiva-
lents65 may mean that the biotechnology industry will be character-
ized by large numbers of narrow patents.
LECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 610-11 (4th ed. 1987).
6' 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
62 Id. at 925.
61 Id. at 926.
64 The very parsimonious reading that the Federal Circuit gives to obviousness in biotech-
nology cases seems to leave wide latitude for findings of equivalence in nucleotide infringement
cases. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffery & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (testing equivalence by inquiring whether a hypothetical claim encompassing the accused
product would have been obvious at the time of invention), overruled in part on other grounds
by Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
65 The courts have recently strengthened other limits on the doctrine of equivalents, nota-
bly prosecution history estoppel and the doctrine of dedication to the public domain. See, e.g.,
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (prosecution
history estoppel applies broadly, though not absolutely); Johnson & Johnson Assocs. v. R.E.
Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (equivalents disclosed in the patent but not
claimed are dedicated to the public domain); see also Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeabil-
ity in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045 (2001) (discussing both doctrines). Those
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C. The Divergent Standards
Patent practitioners often focus on a single technology area,
and so may tend to take the court's rules in that area for granted.
Even a casual juxtaposition of the biotechnology and software
cases, however, shows dramatic differences in applying what are
nominally the same legal rules. 66  District courts have recognized
the difference, applying the Federal Circuit rules in different ways
depending on the technology at issue,67 and at least one Federal
Circuit judge has forthrightly acknowledged that the biotechnology
written description cases apply a different legal standard than the
court's other written description opinions.68 The easiest way to see
this difference may be to imagine the court's language from one
discipline applied to another. In Fonar Corp. v. General Electric
Co., for instance, the court said:
As a general rule, where software constitutes part of a best
mode of carrying out an invention, description of such a best
mode is satisfied by a disclosure of the functions of the soft-
ware. This is because, normally, writing code for such soft-
limitations may prevent any patent from being read too broadly under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.
66 Commentators have observed that the Federal Circuit's biotechnology written descrip-
tion cases apply a standard quite different from the written description precedent in other areas.
See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 16; Sampson, supra note 16; Limin Zheng, Note, Purdue Pharma
L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 17 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 95, 95 (2002). While there are a number of
recent written description cases outside the biotechnology context, all of them involve patentees
who changed their claims during prosecution to cover a competitor's product. See, e.g., Turbo-
care Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.,
134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture
ofindustry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 639-40 (2002) (distinguishing the biotech-
nology cases from written description decisions in other areas, especially Union Oil Co. of Cali-
fornia v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); cf Matthew L. Goska, Of Omit-
ted Elements and Overreaching Inventions: The Principle of Gentry Gallery Should Not Be
Discarded, 29 AIPLA Q.J. 471, 484 (2001) (arguing that the written description requirement
makes sense, but that it should not be applied to original claims as it has been in the biotechnol-
ogy cases).
Other commentators have pointed out that the nonobviousness standard in biotechnology
is lower than in other industries. See, e.g., Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobviousness
Standard for Gene Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. IN-
TELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 154 (2000); John Murray, Note, Owning Genes: Disputes Involving
DNA Sequence Patents, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 231, 247 (1999).
67 See, e.g., Gummow v. Snap-On Tools, Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1414 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (hold-
ing that mechanical patents require less disclosure than biotechnology patents due to the uncer-
tainty in biotechnology).
68 See Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1324-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Rader, J., concurring) (noting the industry-specific nature of the written description doctrine),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 464 (2003). Judge Bryson's concurrence in the same case similarly
treated the biotechnology written description cases as distinct from the claim-change written
description cases. Id. at 1327-28 (Bryson, J., concurring).
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ware is within the skill of the art, not requiring undue ex-
perimentation, once its functions have been disclosed.69
Replace software with DNA, though, and the following would
result:
As a general rule, where [DNA] constitutes part of a best
mode of carrying out an invention, description of such
[DNA] is satisfied by a disclosure of the functions of the
[DNA]. This is because, normally, [identifying such DNA]
is within the skill of the art, not requiring undue experimenta-
tion, once its functions have been disclosed.
This is exactly antithetical to the actual rule in biotechnology
cases, as stated by Eli Lilly:
A definition by function... is only an indication of what the
gene does, rather than what it is. It is only a definition of a
useful result rather than a definition of what achieves that re-
sult. Many such genes may achieve that result. The descrip-
tion requirement of the patent statute requires a description of
an invention, not an indication of a result that one might
achieve if one made that invention. Accordingly, naming a
type of material generally known to exist, in the absence of
knowledge as to what that material consists of, is not a de-
scription of that material.7°
Conversely, of course, application of the biotechnology rule to
software would radically change the law. The legal rules are the
same, but the application of those rules to different industries pro-
duces results that bear no resemblance to each other.7'
69 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
70 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted).
71 Nor are obviousness, disclosure, and patent scope the only doctrines which show such
an industry-specific variation. The requirement that an invention have general utility, which has
been all but eliminated in most fields of technology, is alive and well in the life sciences. See
Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that a patented
device is useful if there is a demand for it). The Supreme Court imposed a stringent require-
ment on pharmaceutical inventions in Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). The Federal
Circuit has relaxed that requirement. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1995). But
the court still requires more proof of experimentation in order to satisfy the utility requirement
in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals than elsewhere. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36263 (July 14, 1995) (describing the law as
setting different standards for the life sciences); Timothy J. Baits, Substantial Utility, Technol-
ogy Transfer, and Research Utility: It's Time for a Change, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 105 (2002)
(describing and criticizing the higher utility standard applied to life sciences); Philippe Ducor,
New Drug Discovery Technologies and Patents, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 369,
431-33 (1996); cf. Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 53 (arguing that the utility doctrine may bar
the patenting of "expressed sequence tags" that can be used to identify human gene sequences).
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Polk Wagner has argued that these differences need not con-
cern us greatly, because they are merely case-specific differences
rather than systematic variations by industry. 72  We simply dis-
agree with that reading of the cases. The court's systematic con-
clusions in different cases, its reliance on industry-specific prece-
dent from case to case, its focus on uncertainty in the biotechno-
logical arts, and its emphasis in biotechnology cases on proof of
structure-a discussion totally absent from the software cases-all
point in the direction of industry-specific rather than fact-specific
differences in legal rules. The only way one can characterize the
cases as fact-specific, as Wagner attempts to do, is to assume that
all DNA and antibody cases have one set of facts, and all software
cases have a different set of facts. At that point, Wagner's argu-
ment becomes mere semantics-the court is treating biotechnology
cases in a consistently different way than it treats other kinds of
cases, regardless of the reason.73
II. MODULATING TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFICITY
Besides divergent results, our survey of the biotechnology
patent cases also highlights an important reciprocal relationship
between obviousness and disclosure. In biotechnology, where
highly detailed disclosure is required to satisfy the enablement and
written description standards, similarly detailed disclosure in the
prior art is required to render the invention obvious. The Federal
Circuit takes the patentability requirements of nonobviousness and
disclosure as firmly tied to a common standard. The use and mis-
use of that common standard, then, is central to the development of
technologically tailored patent rules.
A. The Role of the PHOSITA
The common standard connecting the requirements of obvi-
ousness and disclosure is the requirement in each statutory section
that obviousness and the sufficiency of disclosure must be consid-
ered from the perspective of the "person having ordinary skill in
the art," sometimes known by the acronym of PHOSITA.74 Much
72 R. Polk Wagner, (Mostly) Against Exceptionalism, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: ADVANCES IN GENETICS 367 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) [herein-
after Wagner, (Mostly) Against Exceptionalism]; Wagner, Path Dependency, supra note 16, at
1351-56; see also Sung, supra note 16 (making the same argument for the biotechnology cases).
73 Wagner falls back on the alternative argument that most of the cases we discuss are de-
cided by one judge, Judge Lourie. Wagner, Path Dependency, supra note 16, at 1352 & nn.28-
29. This is true. But if the Federal Circuit is willing to delegate the writing of its biotechnology
decisions to a single judge, as seems to be the case, Wagner is wrong to dismiss that judge's
opinions as idiosyncratic or to suggest that they will not set binding precedent for future panels.
74 John 0. Tresansky, PHOSITA-The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law,
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of the case law concerning the PHOSITA arises out of the consid-
eration of the obviousness standard found in section 103 of the
Patent Act.75 Although originally developed as a common law
doctrine, the nonobviousness criterion was codified in the 1952
Patent Act as a requirement that the claimed invention taken as a
whole not be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time
the invention was made.76
The PHOSITA is equally central to calibrating the legal stan-
dard for patent disclosure. As the quid pro quo for her period of
exclusive rights over an invention, the inventor must fully disclose
the invention to the public. The first paragraph of section 112 re-
quires that this disclosure enable "any person skilled in the art" to
make and use the claimed invention.77 The parallel language sug-
gests that the inventor's compliance with the requirement of en-
ablement should be measured with reference to a standard similar
or identical to that in section 103; indeed, the language appears to
tie the enablement requirement to nonobviousness via this shared
78
metric.
This same language sets the metric for several related disclo-
sure doctrines as well. First, the definition of enablement affects
the patentability requirement of specific utility, as the invention
must operate as described in the specification if the inventor is to
enable one of ordinary skill to use it.7 9 Additionally, compliance
with the independent requirements of adequate written description
and best mode disclosure is measured with reference to the under-
standing of a "person skilled in the art., 80  And finally, the defi-
niteness of patent claims, which must be written so as to warn
members of the public just what is and is not covered by the pat-
ent, has traditionally been assessed with regard to the knowledge
of one having ordinary skill in the art. If the terms of the claims
would not be comprehensible to such a person, then they failed the
requirements of section 112.81
73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 37 (1991); see also ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 4.3 (5th ed. 2001); Joseph P. Meara, Note, Just Who Is the Person
Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent Law's Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267
(2002). The first known use of the term PHOSITA appears to be in Cyril A. Soans, Some Ab-
surd Presumptions in Patent Cases, 10 IDEA 433, 438 (1966).
75 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
76 Id.
77 35 U.S.C. § 112 1 (2000).
78 The language of the two statutes is not identical, however, and one might draw a dis-
tinction between one of ordinary skill and "any person skilled," on the theory that the latter
standard includes those with less than ordinary skill. More on this below.
79 See, e.g., Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
80 E.g., In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
81 The Federal Circuit's recent decision in Exxon Research & Engineering Co. v. United
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The PHOSITA is nothing if not versatile, and may also show
up as a convenient metric in other unexpected areas, including ju-
dicially created patent doctrines. Claim construction requires ref-
erence to how the PHOSITA would understand terms in the patent
claims.82 The PHOSITA reappears in some formulations of the
standard for infringement by equivalents. In its germinal opinion
on the doctrine of equivalents, Graver Tank, the Supreme Court
indicated that the equivalence between elements of an allegedly
infringing device and those of a claimed invention might be tested
by determining whether the elements were known in the art to be
substitutes for one another.83 The Federal Circuit strengthened this
use of the PHOSITA by making the "reasonable interchangeabil-
ity" of elements-judged from the perspective of one of ordinary
skill in the art-a fundamental test for equivalence. 84 A great deal
of patent doctrine therefore rests upon the measurement of some
legal parameter against the skill and knowledge of the PHOSITA.
This is not to say the PHOSITA has any actual skill or knowl-
edge. Like her cousin, the reasonably prudent person in tort law,85
the PHOSITA is something of a juridical doppelganger, 86 embody-
ing a legal standard for patentability rather than the actual capabil-
ity of any individual or group of individuals. 87 Courts have on oc-
casion equated the knowledge of a given individual, such as a pat-
88
ent examiner, with that of the PHOSITA. But courts walk a fine
line between taking the skill of an examiner or other artisan as
probative evidence of the level of skill in the art and equating the
skill of such persons with the characteristics of the hypothetical
PHOSITA.89 Further, unlike any actual person of skill in the art,
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001), however, holds that indefiniteness is a pure ques-
tion of law. How the court will resolve the understanding of the PHOSITA as a legal matter is
not entirely clear, though it undertakes a similar burden in construing patent claims. See Cybor
Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
82 See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6
(2000).
83 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
84 See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc), affd in part & rev'd in part on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
85 See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(comparing the PHOSITA to the "reasonable man" in tort law).
86 Id. (characterizing the PHOSITA as a "ghost").
87 See, e.g., Stewart-Warner Corp. v. City of Pontiac, 767 F.2d 1563, 1570 (Fed. Cir.
1985); David E. Wigley, Evolution of the Concept of Non-Obviousness of the Novel Invention:
From a Flash of Genius to the Trilogy, 42 ARtz. L. REV. 581, 598-99 (2000); Michael H. Davis,
Patent Politics 23 (Working Paper, Sept. 12, 2001) (observing that the PHOSITA standard is
"undeniably fictional"), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfnI/SSRNID282056_code
010901560.pdf~abstractid=282056 (last visited Feb. 5, 2004).
88 See Tresansky, supra note 74, at 51 (collecting cases).
89 See, e.g., In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F.
Supp. 1354, 1361-62 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Easterbrook, J., sitting by designation) (taking the finding
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the PHOSITA is endowed with knowledge of all of the relevant
prior art references.
90
This places the standard for patentability on a legally objec-
tive, rather than subjective, footing. The PHOSITA standard
measures the inventor's achievements against a judicially deter-
mined external metric, rather than against an expectation based on
whatever level of skill the inventor might actually possess. The
standard also has the practical effect of avoiding the requirement
that judges and other arbiters of patentability be experts in a given
field. The PHOSITA standard is thus an ultimate conclusion of
law based upon evidence, 91 not dictated by the capabilities or
knowledge of the Patent Office examiner, a reviewing judge, or
even that of the inventor:
Realistically, courts never have judged patentability by what
the real inventor/applicant/patentee could or would do. Real
inventors, as a class, vary in their capacities from ignorant
geniuses to Nobel laureates; the courts have always applied a
standard based on an imaginary worker of their own devising
whom they have equated with the inventor.
92
The standard is thus objective in the sense that it does not in-
quire into a particular inventor or artisan's level of skill. But this
does not mean that it is static or fixed. Courts consider a number
of constituent factors that may be adjusted to modulate the re-
quirements for patentability under different circumstances. The
first of these is the definition of the particular "art" in which the
PHOSITA is deemed to have ordinary skill. The PHOSITA is
generally portrayed as having comprehensive knowledge of the
references in the particular art.9 But the parameters of the art are
subject to fluctuation, and thus so is the size and depth of the li-
brary of references with which the PHOSITA is presumed to be
familiar. For example, in the case of a DNA patent, would the
relevant art be biochemistry or molecular biology, or cell biology,
or biology in general? Courts have attempted to avoid drawing
of the examiner, as a PHOSITA, to be probative of written description compliance), affd, 71
F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
90 See In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
91 See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
92 Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see
also In re Nilssen, 851 F.2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences was not required to have ordinary skill in the art to apply the standard); Hodosh v.
Block Drug Co., 786 F.2d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that actual inventors cannot be required
to have the omniscience of the figurative person of ordinary skill).
93 Although, as we point out below, this imputed knowledge varies a bit depending upon
whether obviousness or disclosure is at issue. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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such boundaries by defining the PHOSITA's knowledge as that
reasonably pertinent to the problem the inventor was trying to
solve. But this requires that the court engage in the equally mercu-
rial exercise of defining the problem that the inventor had under
consideration.94
A second PHOSITA variable that may be adjusted to different
circumstances is the level of skill that would be considered "ordi-
nary." Unlike the inventor, who almost by definition is presumed
to be one of extraordinary skill,95 the PHOSITA standard contem-
plates some median or common level of skill. In assessing that
common level, courts may take into account a long list of factors,
including the approaches found in the prior art, the sophistication
of the technology involved, the rapidity of innovation in that field,
and the level of education typical of those in the field.96 The
courts have also endowed the PHOSITA with mediocre personality
traits; she is conceived of as an entity that adopts conventional ap-
proaches to problem solving, and is not inclined to innovate, either
via exceptional insight or painstaking labor.97
Some care must be exercised in characterizing the PHOSITA,
as it is tempting to do so on the basis of an unfounded presump-
tion, which is that the PHOSITA remains constant from section to
section of the patent statute. On the contrary, some commentators
have recognized the possibility that the imaginary artisan found in
these different statutory sections, though bearing the same de-
nomination, might well display different and even inconsistent
characteristics as between the different sections.98 The PHOSITA
for purposes of obviousness may not necessarily be the PHOSITA
for purposes of enablement, written description, definiteness, or
equivalence. Because she is a legal construct designated to em-
body certain legal standards, the PHOSITA could well change de-
pending on the purpose she is serving at the time. Understanding
this difference is critical, because the Federal Circuit's linkage of
obviousness and written description depends on the easy equation
of the PHOSITAs.
Some disparity of this sort does in fact appear in the judicial
characterization of the PHOSITA in the contexts of obviousness
94 See, e.g., George J. Meyer Mfg. Co. v. San Marino Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1285, 1288
(9th Cir. 1970) (deeming the PHOS1TA in optical bottle inspection art to be aware of prior art in
optical missile tracking field).
95 Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
96 See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bames-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (listing pertinent factors); see also Helifix Ltd. v. Blok-Lok, Ltd., 208 F.3d 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that district court erred by failing to consider these factors).
97 Standard Oil Co., 774 F.2d at 454.
Is See Tresansky, supra note 74, at 52-53.
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and of enablement. The section 103 PHOSITA appears to be
something of a problem solver, who the courts set to work hypo-
thetically tackling the problem solved by the inventor.99 To be
sure, the obviousness PHOSITA is not an especially inspired prob-
lem solver, as she is imagined to remain stuck in the rut of conven-
tional thinking. 1' ° But the obviousness PHOSITA is still someone
who is trying to solve new problems. By contrast, the PHOSITA
of the first paragraph of section 112 shows no such innovative ten-
dency, but is simply a user of the technology. If the enablement
PHOSITA shows any problem solving ability, it is in tapping the
prior art to fill in gaps left by the inventor's disclosure-a rather
different skill than that of the obviousness PHOSITA. 10
The two PHOSITAs also differ in the date at which knowl-
edge is imputed to them. The knowledge of the obviousness
PHOSITA is assessed as of the time of invention, while the en-
ablement PHOSITA is aware of information available at the time a
patent is filed. Due to the passage of time, the latter universe of
references is likely to be larger. The temporal disparity is even
stronger when the doctrine of equivalents PHOSITA is employed;
this latter entity knows of all developments up to the date of in-
fringement. 10 2 But conversely, knowledge of hidden or non-public
references which may serve as prior art under section 103 is not
necessarily imputed to the PHOSITAs who make or use the inven-
tion under section 112, as such references are not readily available
to the public.
10 3
B. Misapplication of the PHOSITA Standard
The PHOSITA approach in general represents the proper stan-
dard for patent law. Basing the roof required on the level of skill
in the art makes logical sense.' At the simplest level, this ap-
proach is intended to benefit the public; people who work in a
given technology must understand the patent as it relates to the
prior art, so it makes sense to take into account what that person
knows in order to decide whether a patent is obvious or has been
99 See Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re
Grout, 377 F.2d 1019 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
M Standard Oil Co., 774 F.2d at 448.
101 See Tresansky, supra note 74, at 48-49.
02 See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997) (holding
that equivalence is tested at the time of infringement). Indeed, were it otherwise, the doctrine of
equivalents could not feasibly be applied to later-developed technologies.
0 3 See Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re
Howarth, 654 F.2d 103 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
'I4 But see Davis, supra note 87, at 32 (arguing that the use of PHOSITA is "disingenuous
and almost foolish").
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enabled. From a policy standpoint, the practicality of working in
different technologies requires a flexible approach to determining
disclosure or obviousness, and the PHOSITA approach gives a
court that flexibility. In this sense, patent law is inherently tech-
nology-specific, in essence offering different and fact-sensitive
standards of disclosure and obviousness for different technologies.
But even recognizing that the PHOSITA standard dictates that
different technologies will be accommodated in different ways, the
developments that we have described in biotechnology seem to us
extraordinary and difficult to explain solely by reference to the
level of skill in these arts. Consider, for example, the extremely
stringent disclosure standard developed in the biotechnology cases.
If the PHOSITA analysis explains that requirement, it suggests
that the Federal Circuit believes that biotechnology researchers
need a very high degree of assurance before they are capable of
replicating an invention. Computer programmers, on the other
hand, apparently require very little assurance-simply an indica-
tion of function will do. Similarly, with regard to obviousness, the
court appears to believe that computer programmers can fully en-
vision working code from only a suggestion of function, whereas
biotechnologists apparently need genetic sequences explicitly
spelled out in the prior art to render a molecule obvious. As de-
tailed below, we are not persuaded that the levels of skill in these
arts are in fact so different, either for innovators or for users.
In this section, we seek to understand why the Federal Cir-
cuit's application of the PHOSITA standard has produced such
incongruous results in the industries we studied. One possibility,
which has occurred to previous commentators as well as to us, is
that the Federal Circuit application of the PHOSITA standard in
these technologies is wrong as a matter of science.10 5 One reading
of these cases is that the Federal Circuit seems to have substituted
caricature for a nuanced understanding of the technology. In the
biotechnology cases, the court focuses repeatedly on the "uncer-
tainty" inherent in the field, scoffing at claims drawn to molecular
function rather than structure and demanding precise disclosure of
any embodiment. 0 6 The court seems to believe that biotechnology
is as much a black art as a science, a field where the result of ex-
perimentation is largely out of the skilled artisan's hands. While
the assumption that an art is uncertain may befit a new and unde-
os See, e.g., Rai, Addressing New Technology, supra note 46; Rai, Patent Gold Rush, su-
pra note 46; Varma & Abraham, supra note 46.
106 See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text (discussing the role of uncertainty in the
Federal Circuit's biotechnology jurisprudence).
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veloped field, the court has maintained its assumption that bio-
technology is an uncertain art long after the industry began to ma-
ture.
The Federal Circuit has sidestepped the difficulty of determin-
ing the level of skill in the art in each case by grounding biotech-
nology patent standards in a doctrine of structural foreseeability.
This solution is attractive to the court, as the requirement of fore-
seeable structure becomes an axiom from which other patent stan-
dards can be neatly derived. However, just as we are cautioned by
the old maxim that when one has a hammer everything looks like a
nail, it would seem that the Federal Circuit, having once crafted a
solution based on structural foreseeability, begins to see every bio-
tech patenting problem as a problem of structure. In Bell and
Deuel the court's belief in uncertainty benefits the patentee, since
it means that knowledge of a protein and a method for deriving the
cDNA sequence did not render the cDNA sequence obvious with-
out the disclosure of structure. 0 7 By contrast, the same assump-
tion about uncertainty hurts patentees in cases like Enzo v. Cal-
gene, Eli Lilly and Amgen v. Chugai, because it precludes them
from claiming any DNA sequence they have not actually described
in structural terms in the patent specification.10 8 All of these hold-
ings are based on the assumption that one ordinarily skilled in bio-
technology cannot move conceptually from a protein to a DNA
sequence, or from the DNA sequence of one organism to the corre-
sponding DNA sequence of another organism.
Arguably this understanding of the science of biotechnology
is simply wrong. Robert Hodges has argued that "[t]he key event
is the cloning of the first gene in a family of corresponding genes.
Once a researcher accomplishes this very difficult task, the re-
searcher can typically obtain other members of the gene family
with much less effort."' 9  Indeed, today the process is largely
automated. Such research is properly compared to searching a
"black box" in which are contained molecules of known character-
07 See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); cf Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (using the same standard in an
interference proceeding to benefit one applicant at the expense of another). But cf. In re Mayne,
104 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (DNA sequence in prior art rendered obvious a claim to an
altered version of that sequence that changed only one amino acid).
108See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Goodman, 11
F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
109Hodges, supra note 13, at 832; see also John M. Lucas, The Doctrine of Simultaneous
Conception and Reduction to Practice in Biotechnology: A Double Standard for the Double
Helix, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 381, 418 (1998) ("Making the inventions of Amgen, Fiers and Lilly today
would be routine.").
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istics, if unknown structure; the search is conducted on the basis of
what is known-the function-rather than on the basis of what is
unknown-the precise structure. The function of the molecule that
will be found is predictable, as is the likelihood of finding such a
molecule, even if the precise structure of the molecule cannot be
predicted."°
We should here acknowledge an alternative explanation for
the Federal Circuit's biotechnology decisions: that the court, rather
than stumbling in its application of law to changing technology, is
as a matter of law deliberately creating a unique enclave of patent
doctrine for biotechnology, making patent law indeed technology-
specific."' Yet this alternative explanation seems to us even less
satisfactory than the first. If the court is taking the trouble of fash-
ioning individual patentability standards for different areas of sub-
ject matter, one would expect that the standards fashioned would
be suited to the needs of the different areas addressed. Yet as we
discuss in Part III, the Federal Circuit's biotechnology cases are
ill-considered as a policy matter.
C. Obstacles to Applying the PHOSITA Standard Properly
If, as we suggest, the concept of the PHOSITA makes sense,
why has the Federal Circuit got it wrong in these industries?
There are several reasons. First, we think that there are several
structural barriers that make it difficult for courts to accurately as-
sess the level of skill in a complex technological art. As a practi-
cal matter, it is worth emphasizing that judges are at a rather seri-
ous disadvantage in trying to put themselves in the shoes of an or-
dinarily skilled scientist. Judges generally don't have any scien-
tific background, and at the district court level at least, most law
clerks don't either. Further, district court judges have extremely
full dockets with many different types of cases. The average judge
may hear no more than one patent case every few years. 1 2 Few of
110 See, e.g., Alison E. Cantor, Note, Using the Written Description and Enablement Re-
quirements to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 267, 310-11 (2000) (stating
that "[tihere is already indication that initial biotechnology techniques are increasingly consid-
ered to be more predictable and are more likely to fall into the category of routine experimenta-
tion" and citing monoclonal antibodies as an example).
"'Wagner refers to this as "macro-exceptionalism." Wagner, Path Dependency, supra
note 16, at 1351.
112 There are roughly 1,700 patent cases filed per year. The exact data for the years 1995
through 1999 can be found in the Derwent LitAlert database, available at
http://www.derwent.com/intellectualproperty/litalert.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2004). The data
that follow were compiled as of June 1, 2000, and involve cases labeled "patent."





those will be biotechnology cases." 3  A very busy judge must
therefore learn not only patent law but also some difficult science
in a very short period of time. Expert witnesses can help, but the
Federal Circuit has imposed some limits on the extent to which
district courts can rely on such evidence." 14  In particular, courts
must avoid the temptation to assume that the expert witness is a
person ordinarily skilled in the art."15  Even the Federal Circuit,
which does not suffer nearly so much from these limitations, ' 6 is
not in a position to fully understand all of the science it encoun-
ters." 7 Given these limitations, courts understandably won't get it





Most of these cases settle, however. Kimberly Moore's comprehensive study of all patent
cases that went to trial found only 1,411 cases in the seventeen years from 1983 to 1999, an
average of less than 100 cases per year. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent
Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 380 (2000). Since
there are over 600 district court judges in the United States, it is obvious that most judges get
only a few filed patent cases a year, and well less than one patent trial a year. In fact, many
judges get even fewer cases than this number would suggest (though others get more), since the
concentration of innovation in certain regions and the permissibility of forum shopping in patent
cases cause patent cases to be bunched in a few districts. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889
(2001) (analyzing where patent suits are filed).
113 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 217 tbl.5 (1998) (demonstrating that between 1989 and 1996, only
three percent of patent cases litigated to judgment involved biotechnology).
14 See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating
that courts may rely on expert testimony in construing patent claims only in rare circumstances).
But see Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (hold-
ing that judges may hear expert testimony on the meaning of patent claims, but may not nor-
mally rely on such testimony). This distinction between admitting testimony to help the judge
understand the claims and reliance on such testimony to set the meaning of the claims may
make conceptual sense, but courts reading this line of cases may be reluctant to hear such evi-
dence at all. Plus, it will not help much in deciding pretrial motions.
More recently, the Federal Circuit has taken yet another tack on claim construction, em-
phasizing the importance of dictionary definitions over either the prosecution history or oral
testimony. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In so
doing, it seemed to denigrate the role of expert testimony in construing claims, perhaps signal-
ing a return to a variant of the Vitronics approach.
15 See, e.g., Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 258 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("[O]ur objective is to interpret the claims from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in
the art, not from the viewpoint of counsel or expert witnesses." (citation omitted)); Endress &
Hauser, Inc. v. Hawk Measurement Sys., 122 F.3d 1040, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that
"[t]he 'person of ordinary skill' in the art is a theoretical construct... and is not descriptive of
some particular individual," and that experts need not themselves be of ordinary skill in the art).
116 While relatively few Federal Circuit judges have technology backgrounds, many of
their clerks do. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent
Validity Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 745, 751 n.23 (2000). Further, the Federal Circuit has
more time to consider each case, has the full record before it, and gets many more patent cases,
including software and biotechnology cases, than any district court judge would.
117 Arti Rai argues that the Federal Circuit should defer to the PTO because the PTO better
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Second, the timing of the PHOSITA analysis complicates the
court's task. While the court will determine the level of skill in
the art during a pretrial hearing or at trial, the appropriate level of
skill in the art is not what people know at the time of trial, but
what people knew at the time of the invention (in the case of obvi-
ousness) or the filing of a patent application (in the case of en-
ablement).1 9 On average, it takes more than twelve years from the
time a patent application is filed until final judgment on the merits;
it takes even longer from the date of invention, of course. 120  So
courts trying to determine the level of skill in the art must learn not
just science, but the history of that science. Courts and expert wit-
nesses must shut out of their minds intervening developments in
the field. This is notoriously hard to do. Empirical evidence has
demonstrated that people in general, and judges in particular, are
subject to a "hindsight" bias: They are likely to reason backwards
from what did happen to make assumptions about what was likely
to happen ex ante. 121  The Federal Circuit has repeatedly recog-
nized the problem of hindsight bias in its obviousness jurispru-
dence, 122 and has built rules designed to cope with it there, 23 but
understands biotechnology. Rai, Patent Gold Rush, supra note 46, at 202. We agree with her
that the Federal Circuit makes mistakes in this area. We are not persuaded that the PTO can do
any better, however, particularly given the minimal time examiners can spend on any one inven-
tion. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495,
1500 (2001) (noting that examiners spend only eighteen hours per application on average).
I8 Cf Stephen L. Carter, Custom, Adjudication, and Petrushevsky's Watch: Some Notes
from the Intellectual Property Front, 78 VA. L. REV. 129, 132 (1992) (worrying that judges may
not be particularly good at "judicial anthropology"--discerning an industry's customs).
119See Arkie Lures, Inc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc., 119 F.3d 953, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(holding that PHOSITA analysis must "focus on conditions as they existed when the invention
was made" in obviousness cases).
120 Allison & Lemley, supra note 113, at 236 tbl. 11 (12.3 years on average). This has been
a particular problem in biotechnology cases, particularly because they spend longer in prosecu-
tion and because biotechnology patents are often most valuable at the end of their lives. See,
e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (sixteen-year-
old invention); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(eighteen-year-old invention); Jeffrey S. Dillen, DNA Patentability-Anything but Obvious,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 1023, 1038 (noting this time lag).
121 There is interesting empirical literature in the behavioral law and economics movement
on hindsight bias. The existence of such a bias is well documented. In the behavioral science
literature, see, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight * Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge
on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PER-
FORMANCE 288 (1975); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judg-
ing Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). In the legal literature, see,
e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1053, 1095 (2000); Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1955, 2000 (2001). There is even empirical evidence that federal judges are subject to
hindsight bias. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777,
799-805 (2001).
122 See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Mon-
arch Knitting Mach. Corp. v. Sulzer Morat GmBH, 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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hindsight bias risks infecting the PHOSITA analysis in enablement
and claim scope as well. Hindsight bias will normally lead fact-
finders to overestimate the level of skill in the art, since subse-
quent advances will suggest that the invention could not have been
that difficult to do. This effect is likely to be the most pronounced
in technologies that are familiar or readily understood by the trier
of fact-that is, in the "predictable" arts. Occasionally, however,
hindsight bias may have the opposite effect, notably where certain
things known or believed at one time to be feasible turn out later to
be more difficult than anticipated.
124
Finally, the backward-looking nature of the legal system itself
creates a problem that is in some sense the opposite of the hind-
sight bias. Legal rules are based on stare decisis. The law accu-
mulates nuance over time by respecting and building on the body
of existing precedent. Only rarely will courts expressly reject their
prior decisions. This system has worked well over time in produc-
ing thoughtful legal rules. 25  Judges trained in this process will
naturally tend to apply it to factual issues they see repeatedly. In-
deed, doing so seems economical as well, since revisiting those
factual determinations appears redundant. Thus, once the Federal
Circuit has ruled on the level of skill in a particular art, the tempta-
tion is strong for both that court and district courts to apply that
determination in subsequent cases. This tendency is evident in
biotechnology cases. The court in In re Bell concluded that
knowledge of an amino acid sequence produced by a gene, coupled
with a plan for identifying the DNA sequence of the gene, did not
render the DNA sequence itself obvious. 126 In re Deuel relied on
Bell's conclusion, despite the fact that biotechnology had advanced
somewhat between the two inventions.1 7  In Regents of the Uni-
123 See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Our case law makes
clear that the best defense against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obvi-
ousness analysis is rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or
motivation to combine prior art references."). Indeed, the Federal Circuit may have overcom-
pensated, making it very difficult to combine references in order to prove obviousness. See
Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L. REV. 255,
301 (1997). For an extremely strict statement of the legal standard on combining references, see
In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
124 For a detailed discussion of hindsight in biotechnology cases, see Lawrence M. Sung,
On Treating Past as Prologue, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 75.
,25 For arguments suggesting the common law evolves towards efficiency over time, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10-12 (2d. ed. 1977); George L. Priest, The
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H.
Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Egicient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). Whether or not this
controversial claim is correct, stare decisis is clearly entrenched in the legal mindset.
261n re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
127 In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In Bell, the prior art disclosed the
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versity of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 28 the court expressly relied
on its conclusions about the level of skill in the art in Bell and
Deuel to determine its conclusions regarding written description.1
29
Fiers is even more explicit in this regard, creating a firm rule that
conception of a DNA sequence requires a listing of that sequence
"irrespective of the complexity or simplicity of the method of iso-
lation."'3 °
While apparently logical, the reliance on industry-specific
precedent in determining the level of skill in the art is problematic.
First, while both obviousness and enablement rely on the PHO-
SITA construct, the PHOSITA is not necessarily the same for ob-
viousness and enablement even in a single case. Obviousness is
tested at the time the invention was made, while enablement is
tested at the time the application was filed. Clearly the application
cannot be filed until after the date of invention, and in some cases
several years elapse between the two.' 3 ' Knowledge in the art can
change during this period, sometimes dramatically. Second, and
more important, the level of skill in the art will normally change
between the dates of different inventions. It is hazardous, there-
fore, to rely on one court's statement of the level of skill in the art
amino acid sequence for the proteins of interest, and a method for cloning genes. By contrast,
the art in Deuel disclosed only a partial amino acid sequence. Nonetheless, the passage of sev-
eral years between the priority dates of the applications (Deuel's application was first filed Jan.
8, 1990, and Bell's application was filed June 16, 1987) was ignored by the court, which did not
focus on or even mention when the inventions occurred.
12 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
129 The court stated:
[E]xample 6 provides the amino acid sequence of the human insulin A and B
chains, but that disclosure also fails to describe the cDNA. Recently, we held that a
description which renders obvious a claimed invention is not sufficient to satisfy the
written description requirement of that invention. Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572, 41
USPQ2d at 1966. We had previously held that a claim to a specific DNA is not
made obvious by mere knowledge of a desired protein sequence and methods for
generating the DNA that encodes that protein. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552,
1558, 34 USPQ2d 1210, 1215 (1995) ("A prior art disclosure of the amino acid se-
quence of a protein does not necessarily render particular DNA molecules encoding
the protein obvious because the redundancy of the genetic code permits one to hy-
pothesize an enormous number of DNA sequences coding for the protein."); In re
Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785, 26 USPQ2d 1529, 1532 (Fed.Cir.1993). Thus, afortiori, a
description that does not render a claimed invention obvious does not sufficiently
describe that invention for purposes of § 112, 1. Because the '525 specification
provides only a general method of producing human insulin cDNA and a description
of the human insulin A and B chain amino acid sequences that cDNA encodes, it
does not provide a written description of human insulin cDNA.
Id. at 1567.
1
30 Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
13' The law permits a one-year grace period between any public act and the filing of a pat-
ent application. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). But many inventors wait even longer between
invention and the filing of an application. This is permissible, so long as they do not put the




as determinative or even evidentiary of the level of skill in the
same art at a different time. The level of skill in the art is a factual
question that must be determined anew on the particulars of each
case. 132
A related problem is the equally time-honored tradition of
reasoning by analogy. If courts and lawyers cannot find precedent
directly on point, they will turn to the closest available analogue.
In the case of biotechnology, the court appears to have taken its
understanding of DNA directly from its small-molecule chemistry
cases of a generation before. But if reliance on precedent is bad in
the case of the PHOSITA, reliance on analogy is worse. Expand-
ing the search for the PHOSITA beyond a narrow definition of the
field in question will almost certainly get it wrong, as indeed the
court has done in the biotechnology cases. Given the fact-specific
nature of the inquiry, the Federal Circuit may need to resist its ten-
dency-well documented in other areas-to substitute its factual
conclusions for those of the district court. 133 A clear signal by the
Federal Circuit that identifying the PHOSITA is a fact-specific
question that must be decided anew in each case (perhaps by refer-
ence to expert testimony) might go a long way towards solving the
problem of substituting precedent and analogy for detailed analy-
sis. 13 4 Courts should also spend more time and effort fleshing out
the PHOSITA, who in many opinions seems to be mentioned only
perfunctorily.135 We offer more ideas for tailoring the treatment of
the PHOSITA elsewhere. 1
36
132 For a detailed discussion, see Dillen, supra note 120, at 1039-44. The U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1250 (C.C.P.A. 1977), and the
Federal Circuit in Enzo Biochem., Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1374 n.10 (Fed. Cir.
1999), both recognized this. However, it has proven a hard rule to adhere to.
133 See, e.g., William C. Rooklidge & Matthew F. Weil, Judicial Hyperactivity: The Fed-
eral Circuit's Discomfort with Its Appellate Role, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 725 (2000); see also
Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-institutional Approach to Patent System Re-
form, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003) (arguing that the Federal Circuit's preoccupation with
making factual determinations has prevented it from taking a leadership role in guiding legal
rules). Empirical data suggests that the Federal Circuit is particularly unlikely to defer to dis-
trict court rulings construing patent claims. See Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the
Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001); Kimberly
A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1 (2001). Rai also argues that the Federal Circuit has not shown sufficient deference to
factfinders in obviousness and disclosure cases. See Rai, supra.
34 In this respect we agree with Wagner, who argues that improper determinations of the
PHOSITA in one case should not bind courts in a later case. Wagner, (Mostly) Against Excep-
tionalism, supra note 72, at 6. But since the Federal Circuit has relied on such prior determina-
tions, we see the current state of affairs as more problematic than he does.
135 See Meara, supra note 74 (arguing that the existing factors for determining skill in the
art do not work very well, and suggesting ways to refine the PHOSITA inquiry).
t36See Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 15, at 1202-05.
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III. INNOVATION, INVENTION AND UNCERTAINTY
The fact that the court has created technology-specific patent
rules for biotechnology is not necessarily a bad thing. As we have
suggested elsewhere, different industries experience both innova-
tion and the patent system in very different ways. 137 Biotechnol-
ogy is no different. We don't object, therefore, to the idea that
courts treat biotechnology differently. Indeed, we embrace it. Ex-
isting law creates a variety of "policy levers" that permit and in-
deed may compel the courts to do so. Our concern is instead that
courts do not seem to take the actual characteristics of the industry
into account. As a result, the specific biotechnology rules the
court has created don't work for the biotechnology industry. In
this section, we talk briefly about the theories of patent law that fit
the economics of biotechnology, and what those theories imply for
optimal biotechnology patent policy.
38
A. Theories of Biotechnology Patents
There are a number of different economic theories of the pat-
ent system. These approaches exist in considerable tension. They
make different and conflicting predictions about the effect of pat-
ents on industries, and dictate different and conflicting prescrip-
tions for the parameters of patent law. We discuss five different
theories in detail elsewhere; 139 here we briefly review the two that
apply most neatly to biotechnology.
1. Prospect Theory
In 1977, Edmund Kitch offered a new theory of the patent
system, one which he said would "reintegrate[] the patent institu-
tion with the general theory of property rights."' 4 This prospect,
or property rights, theory of intellectual property is rooted in many
of the same economic traditions as the classic incentive-to-invent
theory, but its focus is not on ex ante incentives to create as much
as it is on the ability of intellectual property ownership to force the
137 Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 3.
138 Wagner argues that even if we are right that the court is creating specific rules for bio-
technology, the solution is to abandon those rules and adhere to a uniform system. Wagner,
Path-Dependency, supra note 16, at 1356-58. We have explained elsewhere both why industry-
specific patent law is necessary in the modem world, see Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra
note 3, and why courts are the right body to tailor that law. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEM-
LEY, TAILORING INNOVATION: SHAPING PATENT POLICY FOR SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES (forthcom-
ing 2005). As a result, we do not respond to his complaints here.
139 See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 3, at Part II.A.




efficient use of inventions and creations through licensing once
they are made.14' The fundamental economic bases of this ap-
proach are the "tragedy of the commons" and the hypothetical
Coasean world without transactions costs. The tragedy of the
commons is a classic economic story, in which common property
will be over-used by people who have access to it, since each indi-
vidual reaps all of the benefits of his personal use, but shares only
a small portion of the costs. Thus, lakes open to the public are
likely to be over-fished, with negative consequences for the public
(to say nothing of the fish!) in future years. Common fields will
be over-grazed, with similarly unfortunate consequences. Any
other exhaustible resource may be misallocated if publicly avail-
able.
The conventional economic solution to the tragedy of the
commons is to assign resources as private property. If everyone
owns a small piece of land (or lake), and can keep others out of it
(with real or legal "fences"), then the private and public incentives
are aligned. People will not over-graze their own land, because if
they do, they will suffer the full consequences of their actions.1
42
Further, if deal-making between neighbors is costless, as Coase
postulated but did not believe, 43 transactions will allow neighbors
with large cattle herds to purchase grazing rights from others with
smaller herds. Such transactions should occur until each piece of
land is put to its best possible use. 144
141 See id. at 276-78; Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and In-
tellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 473 (1992); Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules,
Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994).
142 While in theory it is possible for cattle owners to agree to limit their grazing in the pub-
lic interest, any such effort at agreement is likely to run into insurmountable problems. Not only
will organizing and policing such an agreement take effort that will not be rewarded, but indi-
vidual grazers have an incentive to free-ride, reaping the benefits of reduced grazing by others
while refusing to reduce their own grazing. For more on these problems, see MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). One commentator views this internalization of
(negative) externalities as a key function of property. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (1967).
On the other hand, for a rejection of the tragedy of the commons approach in certain con-
texts, see Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). Rose is surely correct that private division of land is
not always efficient. Consider the problematic task walking through your neighborhood would
be if every piece of sidewalk were privately owned by a different person, and you were required
to obtain permission to take each step. Cf. Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL
& EMERGING Bus. L. 27 (2000) (discussing the detrimental effects of excessive division of
property rights on-line); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anti-
commons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439 (2003) (arguing that imposing property rights in the Internet will
result in suboptimal use of resources); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV.
521, 523 (2003) (challenging the assumption that "space" on the Internet is property that must
be owned).
143 See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).144 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
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In the context of intellectual property, Kitch's article remains
one of the most significant efforts to integrate intellectual property
with property rights theory.145 Kitch argues that the patent system
operates not (as traditionally thought) as an incentive-by-reward
system, giving exclusive rights to successful inventors in order to
encourage future inventors, but as a "prospect" system analogous
to mineral claims. In this view, the primary point of the patent
system is to encourage further commercialization and efficient use
of as yet unrealized ideas by patenting them, just as privatizing
land will encourage the owner to make efficient use of it.'46 Soci-
ety as a whole should benefit from this equalization of private with
social interests.
Fundamental to this conclusion are three assumptions. First,
Kitch argues:
[A] patent prospect increases the efficiency with which in-
vestment in innovation can be managed.... [T]echnological
information is a resource which will not be efficiently used
absent exclusive ownership....
... [T]he patent owner has an incentive to make invest-
ments to maximize the value of the patent without fear that
the fruits of the investment will produce unpatentable infor-
mation appropriable by competitors. 1
47
This is analogous to the tragedy of the commons argument that
only with private ownership do private incentives match social in-
centives. In the tragedy of the commons, the private incentive to
"invest" in a field or lake-for example, by letting it lie fallow, or
limiting grazing, in order to permit it to grow-is less than the so-
cial value of such an investment. In the patent context, Kitch
makes an analogous argument: that the private incentive to im-
prove and market an invention will be less than the social value of
such efforts unless the patent owner is given exclusive control over
all such improvements and marketing efforts.
Second, Kitch argues:
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing this impli-
cation of Coase).
145For other property-based views of intellectual property, see, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam,
Some Economic Considerations in the Intellectual Property Protection of Software, 24 J. LEGAL
STuD. 321 (1995); 1. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CR1.
LEGAL F. 217; Edmund Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 REs. L. & ECON. 31
(1986).
146 Kitch, supra note 140, at 270-71, 275 (making the analogy to land explicit).
147 Id. at 276.
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No one is likely to make significant investments searching
for ways to increase the commercial value of a patent unless
he has made previous arrangements with the owner of the
patent. This puts the patent owner in a position to coordinate
the search for technological and market enhancement of the
patent's value so that duplicative investments are not made
and so that information is exchanged among the searchers.
1 48
This is the Coase theorem at work. Under that theory, giving one
party the power to control and orchestrate all subsequent use and
research relating to the patented technology should result in effi-
cient licensing, both to end users and to potential improvers-
assuming, that is, that information is perfect, all parties are ra-
tional, and licensing is costless.
49
Finally, for social benefit to be maximized, the property
owner must make the invention (and subsequent improvements)
available to the public at a reasonable price-ideally, one that ap-
proaches marginal cost as much as is feasible. 50  But a property
owner will have no incentive to reduce his prices toward marginal
cost unless he faces competition from others. If the property
owner is alone in the market, he may be expected to set a higher
monopoly price for his goods, to the detriment of consumers (and
social welfare). Kitch notes this problem, but does not resolve it.
He merely points out that not all patents confer monopoly rights,
and that in some cases the creators of intellectual property rights
will face competition from the makers of other fungible goods, and
therefore that their individual firm demand curves will be horizon-
tal rather than downward-sloping. 151 If one assumes such competi-
tion, intellectual property owners may be expected to price com-
petitively, just as producers of wheat do. 152
148 Id.
149 See Anastasia P. Winslow, Rapping on a Revolving Door: An Economic Analysis of
Parody and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 780 (1996) (arguing
that the Coase theorem suggests that initial assignment of property rights between original crea-
tors and improvers is irrelevant). For a discussion of what happens when we relax these unreal-
istic assumptions, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 1048-72 (1997). On the importance of efficient licensing to the case
for intellectual property protection, see Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and
Prisoner's Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 857 (1992).
150It is not possible to price intellectual property at its marginal cost and still stay in the
business of producing new works, since developing those new works requires a fixed invest-
ment of resources (time, research money, etc.), one that frequently dwarfs the marginal cost of
making and distributing copies of the idea once it has been developed.
151 Kitch, supra note 140, at 274.
152 Christopher Yoo has offered a more sophisticated analysis of what might happen in im-
perfectly competitive markets for intellectual property, though his analysis focuses on copyright
rather than patent law. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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Kitch's prospect theory strongly emphasizes the role of a sin-
gle patentee in coordinating the development, implementation, and
improvement of an invention. The analogy to mining is instruc-
tive: Kitch's theory is that if we consolidate ownership in a single
entity, that entity will have appropriate incentives to invest in
commercializing and improving an invention. Indeed, on Kitch's
theory one might think it appropriate to assign rights to prospect
for inventions to companies even before they have invented any-
thing, just as we do for the owners of prospecting rights, because
doing so will give them the monopoly incentive to coordinate the
search.
Kitch's prospect theory draws on economic literature in the
Schumpeterian tradition, which in its strong form holds that com-
panies in a competitive marketplace have insufficient incentive to
innovate. On this view, only strong rights to preclude competition
will effectively encourage innovation. 53 Prospect theory therefore
suggests that patents should be granted early in the invention proc-
ess, and should have broad scope and few exceptions.
Prospect theory is based on the premise that strong rights
should be given into the hands of a single coordinating entrepre-
neur. Thus, prospect theory necessarily envisions invention as
something done by a single firm, rather than collectively; as the
result of significant expenditure on research, rather than the result
of serendipitous or inexpensive research; and as only the first step
in a long and expensive process of innovation, rather than as an
activity close to a final product. 154  As a result, prospect theory
suggests that patents should stand alone, should be broad, and
should confer almost total control over subsequent uses of the
product.1
55
The prospect vision of patents maps most closely to invention
in the pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical innovation is noto-
15 3 The classic argument cited in favor of monopolists coordinating innovation is JOSEPH
A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106 (1st ed. 1942). For an appli-
cation to patent law, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializ-
ing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); cf. Suzanne Scotchmer, Protecting Early Innova-
tors: Should Second-Generation Products Be Patentable?, 27 RAND J. ECON. 322 (1996) (sug-
gesting that incentives be weighted towards pioneers). Schumpeter's conclusions have been
challenged, both in theoretical and empirical terms. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra
note 3, at 1604-07 (discussing this literature).
154 We follow Joseph Schumpeter in distinguishing between the act of invention, which
creates a new product or process, and the broader act of innovation, which includes the work
necessary to revise, develop, and bring that new product or process to commercial fruition. See
RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 263 (1982) (distinguishing the invention of a product from innovation, a broader proc-
ess of research, development, testing and commercialization of that product, and attributing that
distinction to Schumpeter); WILLIAM KINGSTON, DIRECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION (1987).
155 See supra notes 140-54 and accompanying text.
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riously costly and expensive. The pharmaceutical industry reports
that it spends as much as $800 million in research and develop-
ment ("R&D") for each new drug produced. 56 While those num-
bers are almost certainly inflated, 57 there is also no doubt that
R&D is extremely expensive in the pharmaceutical industry.
158
Further, inventing a new drug is only the beginning of the process,
not the end. The Food and Drug Administration requires a lengthy
and rigorous set of tests before drugs can be released to market. 5 9
While imitation of a drug is reasonably costly in absolute terms, a
generic manufacturer who can prove bioequivalency can avoid the
R&D cost entirely, and can get FDA approval much more quickly
than the first mover. The ratio of inventor cost to imitator cost,
therefore, is quite large in the absence of effective patent protec-
tion. As a result, it is likely that innovation would drop substan-
tially in the pharmaceutical industry in the absence of effective
patent protection. 16° And as a general rule, the scope of patents in
the pharmaceutical industry tends to be coextensive with the prod-
ucts actually sold. Patents do not merely cover small components
that must be integrated into a marketable product.' 61 On the other
hand, if patents do not cover a group of related products, imitators
can easily design around the patent by employing a close chemical
analog to the patented drug.
156 See Gardiner Harris, Cost of Developing New Medicine Swelled to $802 Million, Re-
search Study Reports, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at B14.
157 Among other things, they include substantial marketing expenditures, which should not
count as R&D.
158 Estimates of the average cost of drug development and testing range from $110 million
to $500 million; the latter is the industry's figure. Compare PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF
AM., WHY Do PRESCRIPTION DRUGS COST SO MUCH AND OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR
MEDICINES 2, http://www.phrma.orglpublicationslpublications/brochure/questions (June 2000),
with New Study Expected to Significantly Overstate Drug Industry R&D Costs, Public Citizen
Press Room, at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=942 (Nov. 28, 2001).
159 PhRMA estimates that the total time spent from the beginning of a research project to
the marketing of a successful drug is 14.2 years, 1.8 years of which is due to the FDA approval
process. See PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AM., WHY Do PRESCRIPTION DRUGS COST SO
MUCH AND OTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR MEDICINES, http://www.phrma.org/publications/
publications/brochure/questions (June 2000).
16°See, e.g., JAMES W. HUGHES ET AL., "NAPSTERIZING" PHARMACEUTICALS: ACCESS,
INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
9229, 2002) (finding that eliminating patent protection on pharmaceuticals would cost consum-
ers $3 in lost innovation benefits for every dollar saved in reduced drug prices), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelproperty-comments/snydernoorehughes.pdf.
161 While pharmaceutical companies have tried to find ways to obtain multiple patents on
the same basic invention in an effort to extend the life of their patents, these efforts are aberra-
tions that represent a failure of the system, not its normal function. See Lara J. Glasgow,
Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone
Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227 (2001) (documenting efforts by pharmaceutical companies to obtain
multiple patents on the same basic drug). The patent doctrine of "double patenting" is designed
to prevent this sort of abuse. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
2004]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
All of these factors suggest that patents in the pharmaceutical
industry should look like those that prospect theory prescribes.
There is, in this industry, no serious problem of either cumulative
or complementary innovation. Strong patent rights are necessary
to encourage drug companies to expend large sums of money on
research years before the product can be released to the market.
And because much of the work occurs after the drug is first identi-
fied, it is important to give patentees the right to coordinate down-
stream changes to the drug. Prospect theory fits the pharmaceuti-
cal industry.
2. Anticommons Theory
While the economic literature on cumulative innovation has
generally suggested the grant of divided entitlements as a means of
encouraging innovation by both initial inventors and improvers, a
more recent body of literature has pointed to the limits of divided
entitlements in circumstances in which transaction costs are posi-
tive. Relying on Michael Heller's description of what he calls the
11,,162
"anticommons, a number of patent scholars have argued that
granting too many different patent rights can impede the develop-
ment and marketing of new products where making the new prod-
uct requires the use of rights from many different inventions.
163
Underlying this argument are concerns about transaction costs and
strategic behavior, which these scholars argue will sometimes pre-
vent the aggregation of the necessary rights.
The anticommons is characterized by fragmented property
rights, the aggregation of which is necessary to make effective use
of the property. 164 Aggregating such fragmented property rights
entails high search and negotiation costs to locate and bargain with
the many rights owners whose collective permissions are necessary
to complete broader development. This type of licensing environ-
ment may quickly become dominated by "holdouts" who refuse to
license their essential sliver of the pie unless bribed.165 Because a
given project will fail without their cooperation, "holdouts" may
162 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REv. 621 (1998).
163 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The An-
ticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SC!. 698 (1998); see also Arti K. Rai, The Information
Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the
Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173.
164 Heller, supra note 162, at 670-72.
165 On the holdout problem, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1961). On its specific application in patent law, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Vary-
ing the Course in Patenting Genetic Material, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN
GENOME PROJECT 195, 200 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003).
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be prompted to demand a bribe close to the value of the entire pro-
ject.166 And, of course, every property holder needed for the pro-
ject is subject to this same incentive; if everyone holds out, the
cost of the project will rise substantially, and probably prohibi-
tively.
The "anticommons" problem is really a particular species of a
more general problem in economics-the issue of complementarity
of products. Complementarity exists where two or more separate
components must be combined into an integrated system. Econo-
mists have noted the problem of double (or triple or quadruple)
marginalization that can occur when different companies own
rights to complementary goods.' 67 The problem is this: If a prod-
uct must include components A and B, and A and B are each cov-
ered by patents that grant different companies monopoly control
over the components, each company will charge a monopoly price
for its component. As a result, the price of the integrated product
will be inefficiently high-and output inefficiently low-because
it reflects an attempt to charge two different monopoly prices. The
anticommons literature builds on this economic work, offering ad-
ditional reasons to believe that the companies may not come to
terms at all.'
68
Complements or anticommons problems can arise either hori-
zontally or vertically in an industry. The problem arises horizon-
tally when two different companies hold rights at the same level of
distribution-say, inputs into the finished product. It arises verti-
cally if a product must be passed through a chain of independent
companies (such as a monopoly manufacturer who must sell
through an independent monopoly distributor), or if patents on re-
166 Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 352 (1991).
16 7 The double-marginalization theorem shows that it is inefficient to grant two monopolies
in complementary goods to two different entities because each entity will price its piece without
regard to the efficient pricing of the whole, resulting in an inefficiently high price. For a techni-
cal proof of this, see Carl Shapiro, Setting Compatibility Standards: Cooperation or Collusion?,
in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES Of INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 81, 97-101 (Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). For a description of the problem in practice, see Ken Krechmer,
Communications Standards and Patent Rights: Conflict or Coordination?, Telecommunications
Indus. Ass'n, at http://www.tiaonline.org/standards/star/97/patent-rights.cfm (last visited Mar.
11, 2004) (citing examples in which so many different IP owners claim rights in a standard that
the total cost to license those rights exceeds the potential profit from the product); Douglas
Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615 (2000)
(making a double-marginalization argument in favor of vertical integration in computer sys-
tems).
168"Tere is some evidence casting doubt on whether patents in fact commonly have anti-
commons characteristics. See John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licens-
ing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED EcONoMY 285 (Wesley
M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (conducting a survey and finding no evidence of
anticommons problems in the biotechnology industry). But the potential for a problem certainly
exists.
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search tools or upstream components must be integrated with
downstream innovation in order to make a finished product.
The anticommons literature suggests that too many companies
have patents on components or inputs into products. 169 The prob-
lem is not so much the scope of those patents as it is the number of
different rights with different owners that must be aggregated in
order to participate in the marketplace. Thus, this literature ad-
dresses a dimension of patent rights not really considered in any of
the theories discussed above. It is generally at odds with the di-
vided entitlement proposals of cumulative innovation theory.
There are two different ways to solve this problem: consolidate
ownership of rights among fewer companies or grant fewer pat-
ents. Most legal scholars working in the anticommons literature
have assumed that the solution is to grant fewer patents, particu-
larly to developers of upstream products like research tools or
DNA sequences.17  Economists, by contrast, tend to assume that
the solution to vertical complementarity problems is to vertically
integrate-that is, to consolidate rights in a single company.1
71
Obviously, these two different solutions have very different impli-
cations for patent policy. As a result, the anticommons literature
does not necessarily dictate particular policy results.
Anticommons theory emphasizes the problems of divided en-
titlements among complements. These problems can occur either
horizontally or vertically: horizontally if patents cover different
pieces that must be integrated into a product, and vertically if pat-
ents cover different steps in a cumulative innovation process. An-
ticommons theorists point to the risk of bargaining breakdown
whenever the development of a product requires permission from
the owners of two or more inputs. Different strands of anticom-
mons theory suggest that the solution to this problem is either to
consolidate ownership in a single owner-a result reminiscent of
prospect theory-or to preclude patent protection altogether for
certain types of inputs, particularly upstream research tools.
169 See, e.g., Matthew Erramouspe, Comment, Staking Patent Claims on the Human Blue-
print: Rewards and Rent-Dissipating Races, 43 UCLA L. REV. 961 (1996) (making this point).
170 See, e.g., Philippe Jacobs & Geertrui Van Overwalle, Gene Patents: A Different Ap-
proach, 23 EUR. INTELL. PRoP. REV. 505, 505 (2001) (arguing that patents should not be
granted for DNA, but only for downstream medical products); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumula-
tive Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813 (2001).
171 Alternatively, anticommons licensing rights can be consolidated into a collective rights
organization such as ASCAP or a patent pool, even if the rights themselves remain under sepa-
rate ownership. For a discussion of collective rights organizations, see Robert P. Merges, Con-
tracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,
84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
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Anticommons theory maps very well onto the biotechnology
industry. The biotechnology industry has some of the characteris-
tics of the pharmaceutical industry, with which it indeed shares
certain products. 172 In particular, the long development and testing
lead time characteristic of pharmaceuticals is also evident in DNA-
related innovation. These delays are due in part due to the strin-
gent regulatory oversight exercised over the safety of new drugs,
foods, biologics, and over environmental release of new organ-
isms. Another similarity between DNA and pharmaceuticals is
that generics wishing to imitate an innovator's drug face substan-
tially lower costs and uncertainty than do innovators in the indus-
try. While the FDA does impose regulatory hurdles even on sec-
ond-comers, the process is substantially more streamlined than it is
for innovators. Indeed, the primary regulatory hurdle a generic
company faces is to show that its drug is bioequivalent to the in-
novator's drug. 173 Assuming bioequivalency, the FDA allows the
generic to rely on the innovator's regulatory efforts. The uncer-
tainty associated with developing and testing a new drug is also
completely absent for generic competitors; they need only repli-
cate the drug the innovator has identified and tested. Similarly, the
hard work involved in producing a cDNA sequence coding for a
human protein is in identifying and isolating the right sequence;
once the sequence is known, a follow-on competitor can quite eas-
ily replicate it. And the existence of numerous functional equiva-
lents to a particular DNA sequence means that patent protection
must be broad enough to effectively exclude simple design-
arounds, just as pharmaceutical patents must be broad enough to
cover chemical analogs.
On the other hand, the total cost of sequencing a particular
gene is significantly less than the cost of more traditional drug de-
sign, especially as computers have made it possible to automate
much of the process. 74 And DNA, unlike pharmaceuticals, in-
volves the use of both vertical and horizontal complements. Pat-
entees have acquired thousands of patents on DNA sequences that
cover specific genes or in some cases fragments of genes. 175 Fur-
172 Biotechnology products appear in a wide variety of economic sectors, from pharmaceu-
ticals to foodstuffs to industrial processes. See Dan L. Burk, A Biotechnology Primer, 55 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 611, 611 (1994). Much of our discussion will focus on a subset of biotechnology
that includes gene sequences and gene therapy.
173 For a discussion of this process, see, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S.
661, 676 (1990).
174 See, e.g., Hodges, supra note 13, at 832 (discussing the increasing automation of gene
sequencing).
175 See, e.g., S.M. Thomas et al., Ownership of the Human Genome, 380 NATURE 387, 387
(1996) (noting that from 1981 to 1995, 1,175 patents were granted worldwide for human DNA
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ther, biotechnology companies have patented probes, sequencing
methods, and other research tools. Any particular gene therapy
requires the simultaneous use of many of these patents, leading to
anticommons problems. The problem is exacerbated by "reach-
through" licenses in which the owners of upstream research tools
seek control of, and royalties on, the downstream uses of the
tool. 176
Scholars have proposed several different ways of solving
these aggregation problems. First, vertical integration of compa-
nies may make much of the problem disappear. If biotechnology
companies are owned by, or allied with, pharmaceutical compa-
nies, the resulting company may own enough rights to research
tools, gene sequences, and implementation methods to go it
alone.177 Alternatively, if the absolute cost of sequencing DNA is
sufficiently low, or the non-proprietary incentives sufficiently
great, the anticommons problem could be solved by refusing to
protect certain types of inventions-such as expressed sequence
tags ("ESTs")-at all.178
In short, the structure of the biotechnology industry seems
likely to run high anticommons risks. Product development times
from creation to market are long and costly, but DNA patents are
numerous and narrow. Production of any given product may re-
quire bargaining with multiple patent holders. The potential for
divided patent entitlements to prevent efficient integration into
products is particularly high. Anticommons theory fits DNA.
In the section that follows, we consider the implications the
prospect and anticommons theories have for biotechnology patent
policy. We then talk briefly about some implications of our rea-
soning for the related issue of pharmaceutical patent policy.
B. Designing Optimal Biotechnology Policy
If any technology fits the criteria of high cost, high-risk inno-
vation, it is certainly biotechnology. As we have described, prod-
uct development times may be extremely lengthy due to regulatory
oversight. 79 Yet the onerous regulatory requirements to which
sequences).
176 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching Through the Genome, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROP-
ERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: ADVANCES IN GENETICS, 209 (F. Scott Kieff ed.,
2003).
177 See Rai, supra note 170. Rai is, however, critical of this form of integration.
178See id.; cf. Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 53 (suggesting that ESTs might not be pat-
entable).
179 See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing the delay and cost associ-
ated with pharmaceutical development).
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biotechnology is subject may obscure a more fundamental uncer-
tainty that justifies such oversight: Biotechnology products arise
out of living systems, and are typically intended to interact with
other human or non-human living systems. Such interactions,
whether physiological or ecological, are enormously complex and
the systems involved poorly characterized. As a consequence, the
functionality of biotechnology products is always unforeseeable,
and always involves a high degree of uncertainty and risk. 80 This
risk of unforeseen functional problems is absent for second-
comers, who enjoy the benefit of the innovator's experience.
Thus, while we have argued that the Federal Circuit has been
wrong to suggest that identifying and making biotechnological
products-invention of those products-is always difficult and
uncertain, it is also true that turning those research tools into
medicines that can be sold in the market-innovation-is time-
consuming, complex and risky.
Consistent with these characteristics and Merges' standard
economic model, the current Federal Circuit jurisprudence lowers
the obviousness barrier for biotechnology. 8 1  This lower barrier
seems at odds with the modern science of biotechnology. The
availability of research tools has made routine the isolation and
characterization of biological macromolecules. As a result, con-
siderable criticism has been directed against the Federal Circuit's
biotechnology obviousness cases.1 82  Given such tools, the out-
come of a search for a particular nucleotide or protein seems rela-
tively certain, and hence it is argued, obvious. But if patents are to
drive innovation, rather than merely invention, in biotechnology,
courts must take account of the cost and uncertainty of post-
invention testing and development. 83 The availability or unavail-
ability of a patent is expected to have little effect on the incentive
to engage in preliminary research to, say, use the available tools to
I8mFor example, the Centocor sepsis antibody, a highly promising biotechnology treat-
ment, succeeded in passing many years of costly trials, but failed in the last phase of FDA ap-
proval.
181 See Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 15, at 1178-79.
182 KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 6.2, at 84
(1995); Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons: Imperfect Patent Protection
and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 987 (2000); Philippe Ducor, New
Drug Discovery Technologies and Patents, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 369 (1996);
Rai, Addressing New Technology, supra note 46, at 827. See generally John M. Golden, Bio-
technology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the
American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 125-26 (2001).
183 See Karen I. Boyd, Nonobviousness and the Biotechnology Industry: A Proposal for a
Doctrine of Economic Nonobviousness, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 311 (1997); Robert P. Merges,
One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187,
2225-27 (2000) [hereinafter Merges, Solicitude]; Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Stan-
dard of Patentability, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Merges, Uncertainty].
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secure a macromolecule of interest.1 84 But the ready availability of
tools for finding a new biotechnology product does not change the
high cost and uncertainty entailed in developing a marketable
product using that macromolecule. Hence under Merges' frame-
work, a lowered standard of obviousness might seem to make
sense from a policy standpoint not so much to encourage invention
as a way to encourage the development of marketable products.
185
Yet in its current jurisprudence, what the Federal Circuit gives
biotechnology with one hand, it takes away with the other. Al-
though biotechnology patents are relatively easy to obtain under
the obviousness standard, the accompanying enablement and writ-
ten description standards dramatically narrow the scope of the re-
sulting patents. By requiring disclosure of the particular structure
or sequence in order to claim biological macromolecules, the Fed-
eral Circuit effectively limits the scope of a patent on those mole-
cules to the structure or sequence disclosed. 86 This standard dic-
tates that the inventor have the molecule "in hand" (so to speak)
before being able to claim it. In other words, the inventor can
have patent protection for any given molecule only after a substan-
tial investment has already been made in isolating and characteriz-
ing the molecule. The result is that everyone who invests in dis-
covering a new molecule will receive a patent, but one that is triv-
ial to avoid infringing, at least literally. Under this standard, no
'84 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 519 (2d ed. 1997).
185 See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 727-28 (3d ed.
2002) ("[Section] 103 actually has a bigger effect on decisions regarding which technologies to
develop than regarding which research projects to pursue in the first place."); see also Giorgio
Sirilli, Patents and Inventors: An Empirical Study, 16 RES. POL'Y 157, 164 (1987) (finding that
patents give most inventors more incentive to commercialize than incentive to invent). One way
to think of this is to conceive of patents as a financing mechanism: By providing definable
rights, patents enable companies to obtain the funding they need to turn an invention into a
product. See Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 642-43 (2d Cir. 1942) (stating that
patents may serve as a "lure to investors"); Golden, supra note 182, at 167-72; Mark A. Lemley,
Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 137
(2000); Fritz Machlup, Patents, in 12 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOC. SCI. 461, 467 (David
L. Sills ed., 1968).
186 See, e.g., Plant Genetic Sys. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340-41 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (holding a patent claim to a class of genetically engineered plants invalid for lack of
enablement because only certain types of plants within the class were described, notwithstand-
ing the pioneer nature of the invention); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that describing rat insulin DNA did not justify
claims to insulin DNA for any other mammals). But see Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Rous-
sel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1332-35 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding the written description requirement
satisfied by a broad claim to cells used to produce EPO, where host cells, unlike DNA, were
well-known in the art; the written description "requirement may be satisfied if in the knowledge
of the art the disclosed function is sufficiently correlated to a particular, known structure").
While Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel certainly reads the written description requirement
more laxly than Eli Lilly, it appears to have limited its holding to cases in which those of skill in
the art already know of a correspondence between function and structure before the invention,
something that will not be true in the DNA patent cases.
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one is likely to receive a patent broad enough to support the further
costs of development.187 Indeed, some promising lines of inquiry,
such as the development of drugs custom-tailored to individual
DNA, may be foreclosed entirely if a biotechnology patent is not
broad enough to cover the small structural variations that inhere in
custom drugs.
Unfortunately, this proliferation of narrow biotechnology pat-
ents may be nearly impossible to avoid under the reciprocal struc-
ture of obviousness and enablement in current PHOSITA patent
doctrine. 8 8  In order for the invention to avoid obviousness, it
must be deemed beyond the skill of the PHOSITA to construct
given the level of disclosure in the prior art. Yet this means that in
disclosing the invention, the inventor must tell those of ordinary
skill a good deal more about how to make and use it, effectively
raising the standard for enablement and written description. The
Federal Circuit's insistence that the results of biotechnology re-
search are unforeseeable or unpredictable avoids the problem of
obviousness, but results in an extremely stringent standard for dis-
closure and description. Once again, the result is not optimal from
the perspective of economic policy. We have suggested elsewhere
a doctrinal solution to this particular problem, namely, treating the
PHOSITA standards in obviousness and disclosure as separate pol-
icy based questions, rather than as a common standard. 1
89
18 7 See Kenneth G. Chahine, Enabling DNA and Protein Composition Claims: Why Claim-
ing Biological Equivalents Encourages Innovation, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 333 (1997) (arguing for a
broader scope of biotechnology patents, extending to proteins with comparable biological activ-
ity).
Curiously, Merges does not see this as a major problem, suggesting that in general "the
Federal Circuit has overall been quite successful at integrating biotechnology cases into the
fabric of patent law." Merges, Solicitude, supra note 183, at 2228. We think the written de-
scription cases and the correspondingly narrow scope afforded biotechnology patents are a more
serious problem than Merges acknowledges.
One might question why, if the written description requirement is producing such narrow
DNA patents, the biomedical industries consistently cite patent protection as extremely impor-
tant to them. See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Re-
search and Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACrivrrY 783; Wesley M.
Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7552, 2000), available at http://papers-nber9.nber.org/papers/w7552.v5.pdf. We think there are
two answers. First, the industries that count patents as extremely valuable tend to be chemistry
and pharmaceuticals, not biotechnology per se, and certainly not those in the business of discov-
ering and using DNA sequences. Second, the biotechnology written description cases are rela-
tively new, and the industry-specific studies are somewhat older, so their understanding of the
value of patents may not reflect modem realities, either because the survey is old or because
those in the industry have not yet internalized the effect of these decisions.
188 See, e.g., Mark J. Stewart, The Written Description Requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112(1):
The Standard After Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 32 IND. L. REV.
537, 557-58 (1999) (noting the linkage between the Federal Circuit's view of biotechnology as
an uncertain art and the narrowness of the patents that result).
189 Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 15, at 1202-05.
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But even given such doctrinal tools, courts must confront the
policy question of the proper scope of patents in the biotechnology
industry. The proper focus of biotechnology patent policy is a
matter of some dispute. Merges' classic economic framework
suggests that the standard of nonobviousness should be low to
compensate for the high cost of innovation in the industry. 9 ° Both
the need for effective protection and the anticommons literature
suggest that the disclosure requirement should be less strict than it
currently is, lest property rights be too disintegrated to permit ef-
fective licensing.' 9' But if both the nonobviousness and disclosure
requirements are lessened, the result will be more patents with
broader scope. This in turn will likely produce a large number of
blocking patents. 192 Blocking patents are not necessarily bad, par-
ticularly when they are coupled with mechanisms like the reverse
doctrine of equivalents that will relieve bargaining pressures in
extreme cases. 93 And they will certainly give biotechnology com-
panies incentives to innovate, at least initially. But they do raise
the specter of overlapping first-generation patents choking out in-
novation, particularly where those first-generation patents are
granted on upstream research tools. 194  This is precisely the con-
cern that anticommons theory identifies.
We suggest instead that courts should modify Merges' classic
theory. Lowering the obviousness threshold is only one way to
encourage investment in uncertain technologies. An alternative is
to broaden the scope of the patents that do issue by reducing the
disclosure requirement or by strengthening the doctrine of equiva-
lents for a particular industry; doing either will encourage innova-
190 Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 183, at 67-69.
191 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 163; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public
and the Private in Biopharmaceutical Research, Conference on the Public Domain, at
http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/raieisen.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
192 For example, suppose a patentee isolates the DNA sequence for human beta-interferon,
but because of the lowered disclosure requirement is entitled to claim all mammalian beta-
interferon. The lowered obviousness requirement may mean that future inventors can patent rat,
bat, and cat beta-interferon respectively if they discover those particular sequences; it is well
established that a patent on a genus does not necessarily render obvious claims to a previously
undisclosed species within that genus. E.g., In re Baird, 16 F.3d 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Coming
Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Those
later patents will be subservient to, but block, the original broad patent to mammalian beta-
interferon.
193 For detailed discussions, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intel-
lectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L. REV. 989, 1000-04 (1997); Robert Merges, Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75
(1994). There is some evidence that the reverse doctrine of equivalents may play a greater role
in the biotechnology arena than elsewhere. See, e.g., Scripps Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genen-
tech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (remanding the reverse doctrine of equivalents
question for trial).
194See, e.g., Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 53; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 163.
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tion in uncertain industries not by increasing the percentage chance
of getting a patent, but by increasing the value of the patent once it
is granted. In fact, it seems to us that while Merges is right to
suggest that the standard of patentability should be responsive to
the cost and uncertainty of innovation, obviousness is the wrong
lever to use in biotechnology. 195 Lowering the obviousness thresh-
old makes it more likely that marginal inventions will be patented,
but does nothing to encourage inventions that would have met the
(already rather modest) obviousness standard anyway. If getting
from invention to market is the costly and uncertain part of the en-
deavor, it is these more significant inventions that we need to
worry about rewarding.'
1 96
This alternative approach-a fairly high obviousness thresh-
old coupled with a fairly low disclosure requirement-will pro-
duce a few very powerful patents in uncertain industries. It will
therefore solve the anticommons problem often identified with bio-
technology, while at the same time boosting incentives to inno-
vate. 19 7 This calibration of patent frequency and scope seems to us
the proper response to the anticommons concern found in much of
the biotechnology literature. We worry that the alternate solution
proposed by certain commentators, of largely eliminating biotech-
nology property rights in favor of governmental control over in-
ventions supported by public funds, 98 might unacceptably reduce
the incentive for biotechnology companies to move beyond inven-
tion to innovation and product development.
Recalibrating patent scope through disclosure would seem to
require a much more fundamental rethinking of the Federal Cir-
cuit's section 112 jurisprudence. The court currently requires
more disclosure from patentees in uncertain arts, while our pro-
posal would in fact require less. The key to understanding this
seeming puzzle is the difference between uncertainty about inven-
tion ex ante and the uncertainty about innovation (getting the
product to market) ex post. The court repeatedly intones the
195 See also Eisenberg, supra note 176, at 209 (arguing that the Federal Circuit's low obvi-
ousness standard for biotechnology has aggravated the anticommons problem). Merges himself
notes that increasing the scope of patents is an alternative to lowering the obviousness threshold.
See Merges, Uncertainty, supra note 183, at 47. He does not pursue that alternative in his pa-
per, however.
196 Indeed, Hunt suggests that lowering the nonobviousness threshold actually creates a
tradeoff, increasing the probability of acquiring a patent but reducing the value of any given
patent, and therefore possibly weakening the incentive to innovate. Robert M. Hunt, Nonobvi-
ousness and the Incentive to Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Reform,
Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., at http://www.phil.frb.orglfiles/wps/1999/wp99-3.pdf (Mar. 1999).
197 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 163; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 191.
198 See generally Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 191 (discussing this approach).
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maxim that biotechnology is an "uncertain art.' 199 We think, how-
ever, that it is not so much invention as product development, pro-
duction and regulatory approval that are uncertain in the biotech-
nology industry. From a policy perspective, the result is the same:
Biotechnological inventions need more incentive than other types
of inventions if they are actually to make it to market. But from a
disclosure perspective, the difference is quite significant: There is
no reason to require heightened disclosure of an invention-and
correspondingly narrow its scope-if the invention itself is not
what is uncertain.
Biotechnology, then, is properly described in part by the anti-
commons theory (too many narrow patents must be aggregated to
produce a viable product) and in part by prospect theory (a long
and uncertain post-invention development process justifies strong
control over inventions). A rational patent policy for DNA would
seek to minimize the anticommons problems and give inventors
sufficient control to induce them to walk the uncertain path to-
wards commercial development. A variety of policy levers might
be employed to this end. The utility and abstract ideas doctrines
can restrict the anticommons problem in a few cases by preventing
unnecessary upstream patents (for example on ESTs) that threaten
to hold up downstream innovation. The written description and
enablement doctrines need to be recalibrated to permit broader
claiming of inventions. The doctrine of equivalents can play a
similar role, perhaps by rejuvenating the doctrine of pioneer pat-
ents or by applying the notion of known interchangeability with an
eye towards function, not structure. Experimental use may also
have a role to play, ensuring that the long development time neces-
sary in the biotechnology industry does not interfere with an in-
ventor's ability to patent the ultimate product.2°
C. Designing Optimal Pharmaceutical Policy
Application of the uncertainty principle courts have used in
biotechnology may have pernicious effects in other industries as
well. For example, small-molecule chemistry has long had its own
discrete set of patentability doctrines, developed in a long line of
cases that attempt to accommodate the level of skill in that particu-
199 See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that biotechnology is
less "predictable" than mechanics or electronics).
200 Other policy levers may also be relevant to biotechnology. For example, arguments
against injunctive relief may be stronger in biomedical cases than with other sorts of inventions.




lar technology. 20 1 The rules articulated in this line of cases repre-
sent something of a compromise between the predictable similari-
ties in the characteristics of molecular families and the difficulty in
predicting the effect of structure in three dimensions. As a first
approximation, structural relatedness between molecules disclosed
in the prior art and a novel molecule claimed in a patent gives rise
to a prima facie case of obviousness.20 2 However, chemical struc-
tures depicted two-dimensionally on paper may not accurately re-
flect the properties of a physical structure that exists in three di-
mensions. Molecules react with one another in three dimensions,
and the three dimensional configuration dictates the chemical
characteristics of the molecule.
Thus, even in small molecules, the three-dimensional com-
plexity arising from what appear on paper to be slight changes in
structure may give rise to radically different properties in appar-
ently related molecules. Even with three-dimensional modeling,
the effects of such complexity have long been difficult to predict.
Such unpredicted characteristics occurred with enough frequency
that a rule developed allowing a prima facie case of obviousness in
small molecules to be rebutted by evidence of unpredictable or
unexpected properties in the claimed molecule.2 3 The technologi-
cal assumption built into such a rule appears to be that the PHO-
SITA in small-molecule chemistry can generally predict the prop-
erties of a chemical or group of chemicals, or may occasionally be
surprised by their properties, but either outcome is based on the
molecules' structural depiction.
The rule in these small-molecule cases appears closely related
to that announced in the Federal Circuit's biotechnology cases.
The Federal Circuit has declared that DNA "is a chemical com-
pound, albeit a complex one,' 2 4 and has articulated a desire to
treat the patenting of macromolecules in the same fashion as the
patenting of more traditional organic molecules. In focusing upon
structural depiction as the linchpin of both obviousness and disclo-
sure, the biotechnology cases rely upon, and appear to extend, the
201 See In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (recounting the history of chemical ob-
viousness cases).
202 HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT LAW IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, CHEMICALS & PHARMACEU-
TICALS 155-56, 168 (1992).
231n re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 386 (C.C.P.A. 1963); see also Harold Wegner, Prima Fa-
cie Obviousness of Chemical Compounds, 6 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.J. 271 (1978) (discussing
Papesch).204Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see In re
Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing and
applying Amgen v. Chugai). But see Rai, Addressing New Technology, supra note 46, at 203
(arguing against treating biotechnology cases as analogous to earlier chemical cases).
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line of chemical cases summarized above. And indeed the two
lines of cases reinforce one another; the University of Rochester
court applied doctrines developed in the biotech field back to
small-molecule chemistry. °5 But just as we question the applica-
tion of these rules to macromolecules, we are similarly uncertain
that these special rules for obviousness in small-molecule chemical
cases are well suited to accommodate current chemical research
practice, especially in light of the rules articulated by the Federal
Circuit for macromolecules.
In particular, modern techniques of rational drug design and
combinatorial chemistry seem to push against this traditional con-
struction of chemical obviousness in much the same way that the
routinization of DNA probing pushes against the rules of pat-
entability in the biotechnology cases. For example, small-
molecule chemists now search for useful compounds by first speci-
fying the functions that they hope to find.20 6 The characteristics of
desirable molecules are represented mathematically, in equations
depicting functionally equivalent chemical groups and side
chains.0 7 Based on the predictions of such mathematical models,
chemists can then search through large panels of related mole-
cules, selecting those with the closest match to predicted func-
208tion.
This methodology closely parallels the type of molecular
"search" considered in most of the Federal Circuit macromolecule
cases, where large libraries of DNA molecules are probed in order
to identify those that correspond to an expected functional charac-
teristic-for example, the propensity to hybridize with probes of a
particular nucleotide configuration, and concomitantly the capacity
to code for cellular production of particular gene products.209
Combinatorial chemistry, much like DNA probing, tends to focus
upon the function of the end product, removing much of the uncer-
tainty from the outcome of a search for a desired molecule, but not
necessarily from predicting the precise structure of the molecule
205 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
206 See generally Hugo Kubinyi, The Quantitative Analysis of Structure-Activity Relation-
ships, in I BURGER'S MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY AND DRUG DISCOVERY 497 (Manfred E. Wolff
ed., 1995).
207 RICHARD B. SILVERMAN, THE ORGANIC CHEMISTRY OF DRUG DESIGN AND DRUG AC-
TION 26-34 (1992) (describing the Hansch equation that correlates biological activity with phys-
icochemical properties of drug candidates).
208 See Joseph C. Hogan Jr., Directed Combinatorial Chemistry, 384 NATURE 175 (1996);
Dinesh V. Patel et al., Applications of Small-Molecule Combinatorial Chemistry to Drug Dis-
covery, I DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 134 (1996); Jan J. Scicinski, Chemical Libraries in Drug
Discovery, 134 TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 246 (1995).
209 See generally J. WATSON ET AL., RECOMBINANT DNA 104-07 (2d ed. 1991) (describing
techniques for probing libraries of cloned genes).
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that is ultimately found. Indeed, the role of chemical structure is
to some extent marginalized, as dissimilar structures with similar
functions may be treated as equivalent in narrowing the search.
Just as in biotechnology, a focus on structure rather than function
may render chemical patent protection ineffective because modern
development tools render structure less important to the invention.
Consequently, the industry-specific patent prescriptions for
small-molecule chemistry increasingly resemble those we have
described for biotechnology. To the extent that such research is
done in heavily regulated contexts, particularly for pharmaceutical
applications, it faces much the same innovation profile as biotech-
nology. Other stringent regulatory oversight, such as TSCA over-
210sight by the Environmental Protection Agency, may affect inno-
vation outlooks similarly. Chemistry and pharmaceuticals, like
biotechnology, seem to fit well into prospect theory. Fewer and
broader patents, encouraged by relaxing the disclosure doctrines
and strengthening the doctrine of equivalents, are most likely to
provide the proper encouragement to innovation. A relatively ro-
bust utility doctrine can prevent anticommons problems in chemis-
try by preventing the patenting of numerous analogues to a suc-
cessful chemical by "inventors" who don't know what the chemi-
cal can do.211
One policy lever that will likely take on greater importance in
the pharmaceutical industry than in biotechnology is patent mis-
use. Pharmaceutical companies have gone to great lengths to try
to extend the lawful scope of their patents, by collusively settling
disputes with generic companies,21 2 strategically delaying prosecu-
tion of patents, and obtaining multiple patents covering the same
invention.213 The patent misuse doctrine can play a powerful role
in deterring anticompetitive efforts to extend patent rights beyond
the scope a rational pharmaceutical patent policy would give. 14
210 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2671 (2000) (amended 2003).
211 Alternatively, Becky Eisenberg has suggested that FDA law can serve to encourage in-
novation in pharmaceuticals, not just regulate them, by granting industry-specific exclusive
rights. The advantage of this industry-specific exclusivity is that it is applied downstream, to
products as they enter the marketplace, and not upstream where anticommons problems are
more likely. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reexamining Drug Regulation from the Perspective of
Innovation Policy (2003) (working paper) (on file with author).
212 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, An Incentives Approach to Patent Settlements, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1789 (2003); Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Prop-
erty Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1722 (2003); Maureen A. O'Rourke & Joseph F. Brod-
ley, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlement Agreements, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1767, 1774
(2003).
213 On these latter strategies, see Glasgow, supra note 161, at 248-51.
214 Alternatively, the problem could be controlled to some extent using policy levers relat-
ing to obviousness. Pharmaceutical companies often engage in the practice of "double-
patenting": seeking multiple patents on the same or only slightly different technologies in an
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CONCLUSION
Patent law is becoming technology-specific. The legal rules
applied to biotechnology cases bear less and less resemblance to
those applied in other industries, and particularly in software
cases. One can debate the wisdom of tailoring patent law to ac-
commodate particular industries.215 But if the courts are to create
a new set of legal rules for biotechnology cases, it only makes
sense to try to design those special rules to fit the industry. While
there are good policy reasons to treat biotechnology differently
than other industries, the current legal rules are not expressly in-
formed by the economics of the industry, but by an ad hoc combi-
nation of judicial policymaking and stare decisis. Not surpris-
ingly, they don't reflect optimal patent policy in biotechnology.
We have offered some explanations for this phenomenon, along
with a sketch of how an optimal biotechnology patent law might
look. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit's current trends in bio-
technology will not get us there.
effort to extend the effective life of their proprietary right. Strengthening the obviousness stan-
dard will make it harder to extend patent life through double-patenting, because the doctrine of
"obviousness-type double patenting" precludes obtaining two patents that would be obvious in
view of one another unless the patentee disclaims the longer patent term. See, e.g., Ortho
Pharm. Co. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936,942 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
215For a detailed discussion of the wisdom of both legislative and judicial industry-
specificity, see Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 3, at Part HlI.
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